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Baghdad, Iraq  
01 July 2011



**United States Forces-Iraq  
Quarterly Command Report**

**3<sup>rd</sup> Quarter, FY11  
(1 April - 30 June 2011)**

**References**

- A. *Strategic Framework Agreement for a Relationship of Friendship and Cooperation between the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq*, 17 November 2008.
- B. *Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq on the Withdrawal of United States Forces from Iraq and the Organization of Their Activities during Their Temporary Presence in Iraq*, 17 November 2008.
- C. US Embassy – Baghdad/Multi-National Force – Iraq, *Joint Campaign Plan*, 15 November 2009.
- D. Commanding General, US Forces – Iraq, *Operational Guidance*, 4 October 2010.
- E. US Forces – Iraq, Operations Order 11-01, 6 January 2011.
- F. US Forces—Iraq, Fragmentary Order 487, 21 May 2011 (OPORD 11-01 Change 1)
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## **Overview of USF-I**

(U) The United States Forces-Iraq is a four star sub-unified command that reports directly to the Commander, US Central Command. It was formed on 01 January 2010 out of the consolidation of the Multi-National Forces-Iraq, the Multi-National Corps-Iraq, Task Force 1.4a—Detainee Operations, the Joint Area Support Group-Central and the Iraq Assistance Group. USF-I serves as both the Strategic and Operational command element for all US forces currently serving in Operation NEW DAWN. The USF-I flag flies the streamers of five Joint Meritorious Unit Awards and six campaigns.

(U) The first commander of USF-I was U.S. Army General Raymond T. Odierno. General Odierno had commanded Multi-National Forces-Iraq from 16 September 2008 through the consolidation period and was replaced as USF-I Commander on 01 September 2010 by General Lloyd J. Austin III. General Austin remains the USF-I Commander throughout the time period covered in this report.

## **USF-I Mission Statement**

*"USF-I, in cooperation with US Embassy-Baghdad, the Government of Iraq, and international partners, conducts stability operations through 31 DEC 11 to support Iraq's continued development into a sovereign, stable, and long-term self-reliant strategic partner that contributes to peace and security in the region."*

## **Introduction**

(U) United States Forces-Iraq (USF-I) began the third quarter of the Fiscal Year 2011 still focused on strengthening the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) while planning for the termination or final transition of all the command's missions to the US Embassy-Iraq (USEMB), US Central Command (USCENTCOM), the Government of Iraq (GoI) and other entities by 31 December 2011.

(U) During this quarter there was a noticeable increase in US casualties as insurgents began an increase of activities. In addition to increased US casualties, there were increases in ISF casualties but the overall numbers were still below previous levels.

(U) The fallout from the Arab Spring continued, with increased fighting in Libya and even clashes at the borders of Israel in May, Iraq was not subject to the demonstrations and fighting that racked Libya. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's decision to step down once his term ends in 2014 was seen as a move to prevent the type of activity that consumed other Arab countries. Even though this decision resulted in demonstrations that called for his immediate resignation, Iraq's citizens did not subscribe to the Arab Spring's slogan of *Ash-sha'b yurid isqat an-nizam*

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(The people want to bring down the regime). As the quarter progressed, protests continued in Jordan, Syria and Libya but began to die down in Iraq. The protests in Iraq were never large and did not call for democratic reforms at the national level. Just like last quarter, they tended to focus on local issues such as joblessness, corruption and lack of essential services.

(U) The ISF continued to show increased proficiency in countering the activities of violent groups, even when taking on Shi'a extremists. As that was taking place, certain divisions of the Iraqi Army were learning combined arms tactics and training designed to provide them with the skill set necessary to defend Iraq from external threats.

(U) The quarter was an important one as it set the stage for the implementation of the upcoming Phase II Operations. Throughout the quarter, the key phrase from the Commanding General was that USF-I needed to maintain flexibility.

(U) In late March, three Courses of Action regarding the disposition of U.S. forces at the end of 2011 were under consideration by USF-I. One such COA was USD-C assuming the USD-S and USD-N Areas of Operation as forces retrograded out of the country. On 15 April, General Austin made the decision to pursue this course. This meant that USD-C, which is also known as Task Force [1.4a] was given the mission to cover the final withdrawal of American assets into Kuwait. Planning for this task began in earnest along three separate yet closely connected avenues: taking over the USD-S and USD-N Areas of Operation on 7 September and 20 October, respectively; how to secure forces retrograding through central and southern Iraq when USD-S became part of USD-C; and the approach to drawing down the staff for redeployment while maintaining functionality for the Commanding General. Planning for all these efforts were undertaken concurrently by Task Force [1.4a] staff, with many spending long days and nights pouring over maps and conducting analysis. By the end of June, a USD-C plan to secure retrograding forces into Kuwait was approved.

(U) This document presents a history of USF-I from 1 April through 30 June 2011. It will address major issues that arose during the quarter using the Lines of Operation (LOOs) laid down in the 2010 Joint Campaign Plan (JCP – see Ref. C) as its organizational baseline. Major headings will consist of the JCP Political, Economic and Energy, Rule of Law and Security LOOs. The Security LOO will be broken down further to examine progress made during the quarter along the three Lines of Effort (LOE) detailed in Operations Order 11-01 Change 1, which was published during this quarter. Because of the nature of the USF-I mission, this report references political events within and outside of Iraq as well as the USEMB's activities in support of the JCP.

### **Political Line of Operation**

(U) The Political Line of Operation, as defined in Annex A of the 2010 JCP, supports efforts to achieve accommodation between Iraq's main ethnic and sectarian groups, to develop capable,


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accountable institutions that serve the Iraqi people, respect human rights and the rule of law, and to peacefully resolve territorial disputes.

## Assessment



### (USF-I J5 & USEMB, JCP Assessment 2<sup>nd</sup> Quarter ECG Brief, July 2011)

(U//~~FOUO~~) The US Embassy's overall assessment of the Political Line of Operations at the end of this quarter was that it remained slightly off track. There was improvement as the Political Lines of Operation moved from Amber to Yellow. This change was the result of an improvement in the means by which the KRG and the GoI handle disputes. During the previous quarter the relationship was noted as Amber due to the unilateral movement of Peshmerga forces into areas of the Combined Security Area that surround Kirkuk. This action brought to a halt any progress in a follow-on agreement to the US-brokered Combined Security Mechanism that had been in place in the disputed areas since 2009. At the end of last quarter, the Kurdish forces had withdrawn to their previous positions. The situation improved based on no new incursions and a

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stabilizing of the relationship. This was evidenced by the Arab leaders ending their boycott of the Kirkuk provincial Council.

## **Background**

(U) In early April the Council of Representatives (COR) went into a recess while Iraqi politicians continued to play out their respective agendas in the media. Prior to adjourning the COR unanimously approved the appointment of a new Minister of Planning, the Sadrist Ali Usuf Abd al-Nabi. His appointment may be a gesture by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki to discourage members of the Sadrist Trend from moving into the opposition with Ayad Allawi. However there was no movement in the filling of positions with the security ministries.

## **Stalemate over the National Council for Higher Policies (NCHP)**

~~(S)~~ The stalemated situation at the end of last quarter with no council being formed continued on throughout this quarter. While the Kurdistan Alliance remains supportive of NCHP formation there has been no indication that they are actively working to empower and staff the council. Mistrust remains high among all concerned.

~~(S/F)~~ The reason for the mistrust revolves around perceptions of the NCHP. Prime Minister al-Maliki envisions the NCHP as an advisory body as opposed to a governing body. He believes that granting executive powers to the NCHP would create a government within a government, more specifically, a government within his government. This view is counter by former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi who has pushed for the council to have decision-making powers, including powers over security matters.

~~(S/NF)~~ By the end of the quarter there had been little movement forward on the development of the NCHP. However polling indicated that a plurality of GoI politicians is beginning to see the NCHP as more of a consultative entity rather than a governing entity. If it does become a consultative council, the participation of Ayad Allawi is questionable. Allawi would give the council credibility but without him it would be seen as something less.

## **Dispute over the MOI and MOD**

~~(S)~~ At the end of last quarter Prime Minister al-Maliki sent nominations forward the positions of MoD and MoI. Ayad Allawi himself had put forward the Defense candidate, (b)(6). However he then withdrew that nomination. The rest of the Iraqiyya bloc was prepared to accept (b)(6) but they went along with Allawi's backtracking in the interest of bloc unity. The Kurds took the same position which spelled the end for (b)(6) candidacy. The PM also nominated three interior ministry candidates, but none of these were considered viable until the MoD issue was settled.

~~(C/FVEY)~~ On May 11 Prime Minister Maliki indicated his plans were to try to force a COR vote on his proposed security ministry nominees—Sa'adoun Dulaimi for MOD, Tawfeeq al-

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Yasiri for MOI, and Riyadh Ghraib for Minister of State for National Security. He said he couldn't wait any longer and insisted there were no better candidates available than those he presented. He mentioned the plight of (b)(6) candidate who was accepted by Maliki but whose name was later withdrawn by Ayad Allawi. Maliki was confident that he had the necessary majority in the COR to have Dulaimi and Yasiri confirmed. He did not specify when the issue would come to a vote. COR speaker Usama al-Nujaifi has not yet put the vote on the agenda.

~~(C/FVEY)~~ With respect to the position of MOD, the Iraqiyya Party agreed to reject any candidate that was imposed upon then by the Prime Minister. This was a direct shot at Maliki's choice, former head of the MoD Sa'adoun al-Dulaimi. They indicated they would unite behind one candidate, Salim Dilli. Dilli had been offered up by Iraqiyya throughout the negotiating process, but Maliki has repeatedly said he would not accept him. Dilli himself told a USEMB official that he was now Iraqiyya's "sole and final" candidate and said he believed he had enough votes to win if his name was put before the COR. His colleagues have agreed and insist they are now unified and ready to assert — ~~this~~ right."

#### **Muqtada al-Sadr**

~~(S/NF)~~ It was noted last quarter that Sadr returned to Iraq in late February and met with Iraqiyya leader Ayad Allawi on March 3<sup>rd</sup> in Najaf. Muqtada al-Sadr also indicated there was some dialogue from his camp in regards to reinstituting the Jaysh al-Mahdi. On April 9<sup>th</sup>, supporters of Muqtada al-Sadr staged a demonstration of 25,000 participants in Sadr City to protest the presence of American forces. During the following month a parade of Jaysh al-Mahdi members was held, attracting over 40,000 participants and onlookers.

(U) The parade in May seemed to suggest that they had been reconstituted. However, al-Sadr vowed several years ago to participate peacefully in the process of government. In the last election the Sadr Trend received 6% of the seats in the government and they do not speak for the majority of Iraqis. General Austin noted that a return to violence would be counterproductive to the Sadr Trend.

#### **Mujahadeen al-Khalq (MEK)**

~~(S/NF)~~ On April 7<sup>th</sup> UNAMI representative to Camp Ashraf, Tahar Boumedra, told DepPolCouns that he had had received a visit by three 1.4b diplomats on March 7<sup>th</sup>. During this —od and unprecedented encounter," Boumedra reported that the 1.4b said: UNAMI had —poorly handled" the Ashraf situation; the 1.4b will turn off the loudspeakers around the camp only when the residents' family members are allowed inside to visit their relatives; and the 1.4b will —del" with the situation at Camp Ashraf —very soon." Since February of 2010 a group o 1.4b many of whom are family members of Ashraf residents, has camped near Ashraf's main entrance, demanding to visit their family members. The over 200 loudspeakers

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around the camp broadcast these relatives' messages at high volume to the camp residents, exhorting them to meet their relatives, or to leave the camp and return to 1.4b

~~(S//NF)~~ On April 8<sup>th</sup> the Iraqi Army moved into Camp Ashraf, home to 3,400 members of the MEK, in an early morning operation that left several dead and wounded. There is still confusion about the resulting violence, but the MEK claims 31 dead and 300 wounded. The Iraqi Army officials told media sources that there were only a few minor injuries. A USD-N surgeon who visited the Baqubah Hospital confirmed three MEK dead, seven injured with gunshot wounds, and five with signs of blunt trauma. In the days before the event, various GOI contacts assured USEMB personnel that they had no intention of escalating the situation and merely sought to "take back unoccupied land" located within the perimeter fence to the benefit of local farmers. The operation was planned and carried out on orders from the PM's Office, and the GOI sought to mislead the international community and obscure the details of the operation. The UDSEMB noted "While the actions of the Iraqi Army and the subsequent loss of life are highly regrettable, this crisis may be an opportunity to move ahead on a USG initiative (ref B) to relocate the MEK to another site in Iraq and thus remove it as an irritant to the GOI and our bilateral relationship."

~~(S)~~ On April 27<sup>th</sup> Ambassador Lawrence Butler hosted the European Parliament's chair of its Iraq Committee, Struan Stevenson, and three other EP Parliamentarians (MEPs) to gain their support for our relocation efforts, educate them on the true nature of the MEK, and the realities on the ground in Iraq. Characterizing Camp Ashraf as a "Maoist reeducation camp" that pretended to be a state within a state, Ambassador Butler stated that the MEK was loathed by Iraqi Shi'a and Kurds, many of whom regard the MEK as tools used by Saddam Hussein to put down the Shi'a uprisings in 1991. Mr. Stevenson suggested that future Iraqi Army actions might be worse than the April 8<sup>th</sup> incident and drew a parallel to the 1995 Bosnian Serb massacre of men and boys at Srebrenica. Ambassador Butler, who had served in Bosnia, rejected this comparison. He noted that the 8,000 innocent men and boys living in Srebrenica were systematically rounded up and taken to killing fields whereas the MEK at Camp Ashraf were members of a designated terrorist organization. Ambassador Butler impressed upon the MEPs that the only interim solution was to get the MEK out of Camp Ashraf, and detailed our efforts to date on relocation.

~~(S)~~ By the end of the quarter prominent Norwegian parliamentarian Morten Hoeglund recommended direct talks with MEK leader Maryam Rajavi in order to facilitate negotiations on relocating Camp Ashraf residents. In a discussion on June 5 with Ambassador Lawrence Butler (Foreign Policy Advisor to USF-I), Hoeglund described himself as a friend of the MeK for ten years, adding that he believed that the MeK is now serious about resolving the Camp Ashraf situation. He said he did not believe that direct talks would be used for MeK propaganda. He indicated the MEK understood the need to keep the talks confidential. Hoeglund also offered to serve as interlocutor for any U.S. - MeK negotiations.

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## Protests in the Region

(U) The protests that rocked the Middle East during the first quarter of 2011 continued on into the second quarter but with a greatly reduced intensity as many of the protests attained their objectives. As things were returning to a state of normalcy in Egypt and Tunisia, events were still running hot in Libya and Syria.

(U) In Iraq Muqtada al-Sadr called for million protestors and hoped to get two million for the April 9<sup>th</sup> "Day of Salvation" protests. However, with a turnout of only 29,000 he did not even reach the level of last year's protests. Of note is that the protests in Iraq have been largely peaceful and centered on the delivery of essential services, job creation, and government accountability.

(U) The May 15<sup>th</sup> Nakba Day protests along the Israeli border with Syria were orchestrated by the Syrian Government to shift attention away from the ongoing protests inside Syria, according to *The Daily Telegraph* in their 13 June 2011 edition. The violence that day claimed the lives of 12 Palestinians and injured more than 300, including 12 IDF Soldiers. On June 5<sup>th</sup> 23 Syrian protestors were killed and more than 100 injured after they attempted to enter the Israel-occupied Golan Heights.

(U) In Saudi Arabia the anti-government movement called *Women2Drive* gained momentum. Several women were arrested on June 9<sup>th</sup> north of Riyadh for practicing in a parking lot. On June 17<sup>th</sup> there was another protest in response to the arrest of Manal al-Sharif who had been imprisoned for driving a vehicle with another woman.

(U) The Bahraini Government spent the quarter reacting to the protests that raged during February. On April 15<sup>th</sup> the Government was forced to back off its plan to dissolve the kingdom's strongest political opposition after the United States criticized the move. On April 22<sup>nd</sup> the main Shi'ite opposition claimed that the Sunni-led Bahraini Government had demolished 30 mosques since putting down the February protests. Three days later Bahrain sought the death penalty for seven defendants accused of killing 2 policemen during the pro-democracy demonstrations in March.

(U) On May 31<sup>st</sup> Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa, the king of Bahrain, called for a national dialogue to resolve ongoing tensions in the country. The same day a Bahraini military court accused a number of opposition leaders as well as human rights activists of crimes against the state. They were ordered to appear for interrogation but were released the same day. The next day, June 1<sup>st</sup>, protests erupted across the Shia dominated areas of Bahrain to demand the end of martial law. This was the same day that the State of Emergency, implemented at the height of the February protests, was officially lifted.

(U) The ongoing protests in Bahrain continued throughout June, forcing the cancellation of the Bahrain Grand Prix, a Formula One race. On June 11<sup>th</sup> a protest in the Shi'ite district of Saar,

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held without government permission, attracted some 10,000 protestors. Two days later Bahrain began the prosecution of 48 medical professionals in a move seen as harassing those who had treated the injured protestors. On June 18<sup>th</sup> Bahrain lifted their ban on the largest opposition party, al-Wefaq National Islamic Society. The quarter ended with Bahrain sending 21 opposition leaders to a special security court. Eight of the pro-democracy defendants received life in prison and the remainder were sentenced to between 2 and 15 years in jail.

(U) In Syria proper the effects of the protests from the first quarter of this year continued to reverberate. On April 1<sup>st</sup> protestors were fired on, resulting in at least 10 deaths. Over 30 people were claimed to have been killed during a protest on April 8<sup>th</sup>. Protests in Douma, Harasta, Damascus, Daraa and several other key cities resulted in 88 deaths between protestors and Syrian troops. It was the bloodiest day yet. On the 29<sup>th</sup> of April more than 60 protestors were killed

(U) On April 21<sup>st</sup> the government repealed an emergency law that had been in effect since 1963. This law had allowed the government broad authority to suspend constitutional rights.

(U) Protests continued in May with the Syrian government using tanks and snipers to force people off the streets. On May 6<sup>th</sup> 20 people were killed during demonstrations. Government suppression of protests in Daraa, Homs and other cities continued throughout the month. As June rolled around the Syrian Army besieged the northern town of Maarat al-Numan near the Turkish border.

(U) The quarter ended as Syrian President Bashar al-Assad promised a national dialogue with movements toward reform, greater freedoms and parliamentary elections in a June 20<sup>th</sup> speech that was dismissed by protestors.

(U) After the dramatic events of the first quarter in Egypt, the second quarter of 2011 started off with the *Save the Revolution* day protest. This April 1<sup>st</sup> event attracted roughly 4,000 protestors to Tahrir Square in the largest protest held in weeks. The protestors demanded that the new military ruling council move faster to dismantle lingering aspects of the Mubarak regime. They also demanded trials for key figures to include Hosni Mubarak, his son Gamal and several others to include Safwat El-Sheif and Zakaria Azmi.

(U) Exactly one week later tens of thousands of demonstrators massed in Cairo's Tahrir Square in what was called the *Friday of Cleaning*. The focus of the protest was the failure of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces to follow through on revolutionary demands. The protestors demanded the resignation of the remaining members of the Mubarak regime as well as the removal of the public prosecutor due to his slow pace of the investigations into former government officials.

(U) On April 19<sup>th</sup> the Egyptian fact finding mission investigating the January 25<sup>th</sup> revolution released its report. The report indicated that at least 846 people died in the three week long

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uprising. On May 24<sup>th</sup> the former president, Hosni Mubarak, was ordered to stand trial on charges of premeditated murder for the deaths of the protestors. He could face the death penalty.

(U) On May 27<sup>th</sup> tens of thousands of demonstrators again massed in Tahrir Square yet again as well as in other cities such as Alexandria, Ismailia and Gharbeya in the largest demonstrations since the ouster of President Mubarak. This day of protests was dubbed *The Second Friday of Anger*. The key demands were that there be no military trials for civilians and that those who were responsible for the deaths of protestors in January and February be put on trial. In addition there was a call for the Egyptian Constitution to be made prior to the elections.

(U) In Libya the protests that began on February 25<sup>th</sup> continued on in this quarter. Open fighting continued between rebels and forces loyal to President Muammar Gaddafi. The NATO coalition that took over the no-fly zone on March 31<sup>st</sup> at 0600 GMT was active this quarter. On April 9<sup>th</sup> there was the first no-fly zone violation as a MIG-23 belonging to rebel forces was forced to land. On April 17<sup>th</sup> NATO flew 145 missions and 60 of those attacked targets on the ground.

(U) On April 21<sup>st</sup> the first US Predator drones entered the Libyan theater and two days later launched the first successful drone attack.

(U) In May NATO airstrikes continued against Libyan targets. On several days the number of sorties by NATO exceeded 150. In addition to ground targets NATO went after the Libyan Navy, sinking 8 ships on May 19<sup>th</sup>. By the end of the month it had been announced by French Defense Minister Gerard Longuet that France and Britain were sending attack helicopters to the region.

(U) On June 1<sup>st</sup> NATO announced that it was extending its military operations in Libya for 90 days. By the 4<sup>th</sup> of June British and French attack helicopters were participating in actions. The National Transitional Council of Libya, formed on February 27<sup>th</sup>, was officially recognized by Canada on June 14<sup>th</sup>. The quarter ended with continued heavy fighting on both sides and a great deal of targeted bombing strikes by a variety of NATO aircraft.

## **Conclusion**

(U) The violence that started throughout the region during the first three months of 2011 continued in many of those countries during these past three months. Although there were protests in Iraq, they were more in line with the traditional democratic right of free speech rather than any burning desire to overthrow a repressive regime.

(U) Political progress in Iraq during this quarter, which began with the possibility that the issues that hampered progress last quarter, such as the NCHP and the appointment of security ministers, continued on with no real end in sight. The quarter closed, like last quarter, with no Minister of Defense nor a Minister of Interior being named, leaving USF-I handicapped in its ability to

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engage with the GoI at the highest levels and reach agreements on the litany of issues that need to be resolved before the expiration of the Security Agreement on December 31, 2011..

### **Arab-Kurd Relations**

(U) There has been no significant change since the last quarterly report. Arab-Kurd relations will remain a potential flash point until the underlying political issues in the region are resolved. Reaching the desired end state establishment of a cooperative Arab-Kurd security mechanism within the Disputed Internal Boundaries (DIBs) in Ninewa, Kirkuk and Diyala provinces will be elusive unless the Kurdish Regional Government and the Government of Iraq are capable of cooperatively conducting all security functions and arbitration of disagreements within the disputed areas.

### **Violations of the CSA**

(U) As discussed in the last quarterly report, several Kurdish Peshmerga battalions moved through the Kirkuk Combined Security Area (CSA) and took up positions to the south and southwest of the city in an area under the control of the IA in response to perceived threats to the population on the Feb 25<sup>th</sup> Day of Organized Demonstrations. This move of two Kurdish Regional Guard Brigades (RGB's) and Zervani units (all PUK-linked) was in violation of the established CSA 12 Guiding Principles document that required all sides to coordinate with the provincial Combined Coordination Center and, if necessary, get permission from the Senior Working Group (SWG) prior to moving troops in this area.

(U) These deployments, which lasted several weeks, increased ethnic tensions in the area. The incident focused attention on the volatile situation in the DIBs and reinforced the need for an effective security and dispute arbitration mechanism following the withdrawal of USF-I later this year.

(U) The Peshmerga deployment highlighted Kurdish security concerns in and around the Kirkuk Combined Security Area. In order to provide additional forces to patrol the CSA and have a Quick Response Force available for security issues outside the CSA, the Senior Working Group, in combination with provincial security leaders, agreed to expand the existing Golden Lions Company to a battalion, adding two new companies and an integrated battalion headquarters.

(U) The three Golden Lions companies are composed of Iraqi Army, Iraqi Police, and Kurdish Regional Guard Brigade personnel. Each company headquarters consists of a Commander, Deputy, and Executive Officer from each component. Units will be integrated with IA, IP, and RGB personnel down to the squad level.

(U) The Senior Working Group (SWG) is part of the Combined Security Mechanism which was created in 2009 to reduce tensions and ensure stability and security between Arabs and Kurds in

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the Combined Security Areas. The SWG typically consists of the USF-I DCG (Operations) and chiefs of the IGFC, Peshmerga, and Federal Police. As a result of the February incident, the SWG spent much of the quarter beginning a dialogue to define a mutually acceptable security arrangement within the DIBs.

### **Sons of Iraq (SOI)**

(U/~~FOUO~~) USF-I remains committed to ensuring sons of Iraq (SOI) are appropriately treated by the government of Iraq (GOI) in return for the service and sacrifice they gave to enhancing security and reducing hostilities within Iraq, during the insurgency through today. While transitions remained halted, planning continued. An intelligence capability is near completion and transition plans completion should follow. Transitions themselves could then happen in areas where security allows. Currently commanders assess that only Baghdad can sustain the loss of any SOI. The SOI joint coordination center moved from under the Iraqi ground forces command (IGFC) to the directorate general for intelligence and security (DGIS), a move that has driven improved support to and performance by the joint coordination center (JCC). The GOI has settled into a pattern of paying the SOI two months at a time, every other month. The SOI seem satisfied with this pattern and pay complaints have dropped significantly. Finally, US Embassy Baghdad (USEMB-B) Political-Military (Pol Mil) Affairs Section took over as the lead US agent for the SOI program on 1 May 2011.

(C/~~FVEY~~) Despite the stall in transitions, the GOI continued its talking point of pushing to complete SoI transitions by the end of Dec 2011. The Minister of State for National Reconciliation (MoSNR), Dr Amer Khuzai, whose ministry has oversight of the Implementation and Follow-up Committee for National Reconciliation (IFCNR), reiterated that objective. However, his actions were not always as strong. He expressed the desire to take a slow, quiet approach to SoI transition, likely because the benefits the SoI are due to receive could not be matched by the GOI as Khuzai attempts to reach out to other groups. However, prominent SoI Leader Abu Risha (Anbar) expressed frustration with this approach.

(U/~~FOUO~~) Despite the lack of actual transitions, great progress was made in transition planning. The Directorate General for Intelligence and Security (DGIS) was given responsibility to develop the SoI Intelligence plan after other agencies had failed to make progress and DGIS moved out smartly pursuing the task. By the end of the reporting period, they had developed and begun executing a plan to screen and select SoI as intelligence sources, projecting completion of the process by August 2011.

(U/~~FOUO~~) Meanwhile, the IFCNR awaited the results of the intelligence screening, with the plan to adjust the 2009 transition plans based on DGIS selections. Once those adjustments were made, they would engage the various ministries to ensure their acceptance of the SoI numbers they were to receive. They asked that USF-I and US Embassy Iraq personnel stand ready to help in those engagements.

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~~(C//FVEY)~~ With completed plans, the IFCNR could begin transitioning SoI in any area where ISF commanders deemed the security situation acceptable for the removal of the SoI from their positions. By the end of this reporting period, only the Baghdad Operations Center (BOC) assessed they could give up the SoI. All other Operations Centers reported they needed the SoI. This paved the way for transitions to begin in Baghdad by the end of 2011, but that could be the only province that sees transitions this year, and even these could face significant opposition. From ITAM's perspective, the lack of a Minister of Interior prevents any real progress on SoI transitions to the MoI and progress would require direct engagement with the PM.

~~(U//FOUO)~~ While current GoI plans call for 20% of the SoI to migrate to police forces, USF-I has continued to push for raising or eliminating that ceiling, advocating for the use of SoI in infrastructure police, especially Oil Police (OP). However, during this period, the OP Director stated he would not accept contractor security because of issues associated with having a mixed force of employees (SoI would initially transition in their contractor status until the receiving ministry had the manpower authorizations to hire them as full government employees). He felt the lower contract wages would impact performance, morale and make them vulnerable to Violent Extremist Organization influence. While this may be a true concern, an equally likely assessment of the opposition from the MoI is sectarian given the Shia dominance within the MoI.

~~(U//FOUO)~~ A new proposal was initiated this quarter using Iraqi-Commander's Emergency Relief Program (I-CERP) funds as a springboard to assist SoI members with a business startup. The micro-grant proposal provides SoIs who willingly leave the program a \$4000 grant to start a business. Based on excess I-CERP funds available, the program could reach upwards of 5000 SoI members. The intent of the plan is to jumpstart transitions and provides a model for the GoI to replicate for future transitions. The plan would require the GoI to agree to the proposal and for the GoI to identify individuals, distribute applications, assist in the completion of the applications, and document the members leaving the program. The plan would also recommend the GoI conduct follow-up to ensure the recipients invest the funds in business opportunities and to connect the recipients with local small business administration offices. The plan would require USDs to support application final review and approval and support funds distribution and associated security.

~~(C//FVEY)~~ Finally, the Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration (DDR) Director Dr. Khalil approached the USF-I J9 and USEMB Pol-Mil for assistance in establishing a prototype effort where the GoI would help equip willing SoI in various integrated businesses. One example provided is that some would be farmers, some would open seed store, some would become tractor repairmen and others would engage in mercantile endeavors such as gas stations. Dr. Khalil did not ask for financial support, but to help bring various ministry representatives together to support the effort.

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## **Diplomatic Relations**

### **Kuwait**

(U) Although there was talk last quarter in regards to significant steps forward in the relationship between Kuwait and Iraq, there is still a great deal of tension. These tensions took a turn for the worse as Kuwait announced plans to build a deep water port. This port, Mubarak Kabeer, is to be built on Bubiyan Island at the very mouth of the Shaat al-Arab waterway. The issue with the Kuwaiti port, as far as Iraq is concerned, is that it would render unprofitable the Grand Faw port that Iraq has already signed a \$4 billion contract for.

(U) Iraq is claiming that Kuwait's new port would hinder Iraq's access to its waterways. It would also have a huge economic impact. Instead of the Grand Faw being a lynchpin in the economic development of southern Iraq, the Mubarak Kabeer could cost the Grand Faw some 60% of its business once it opens. In addition Kuwait intends to levy a tax on Iraqi ships arriving at the shores of the al-Faw peninsula through the Khor Abdullah estuary. With Iraq's longtime suspicion of Kuwait still present, some will argue that the Kuwaiti port is the first major salvo in an economic war between the two countries.

(U) Kuwait still demands that Iraq pay some \$20 billion in war reparations from the 1990 invasion. They still demand that Iraq provide full cooperation in regards to the return of its national archives and other artifacts as well as a full accounting of Kuwaiti prisoners of war captured by Saddam's army.

(U) Despite these issues there is still much economic investment in Iraq by Kuwait. One of Kuwait's leading mobile phone operators, Zain, bought Iraqna for \$1.2 billion; making it the market leader. Kuwait has invested \$1.5 billion in the Kurdistan region of northern Iraq. Kuwait has also invested heavily in construction projects in Karbala and Najaf. It remains to be seen just what impact the new port will have but it does indicate that the relationship is changing.

### **Turkey**

(U) On the heels of Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan's visit to Iraq at the end of March, Turkey continued its 180 degree turn in regards to the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). The country that once spearheaded opposition to the KRG continues to develop close economic and political ties with the KRG. Negotiations between the two continue on a litany of issues, including the efforts to pacify the Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK).

(U) As a result of the Arab Spring, investment in Iraq, especially in northern Iraq continued at a dramatic pace. The relative stability political and economic stability of Iraq in comparison to Egypt and Syria makes Iraq a very attractive opportunity for Turkish investors says Sami al-Arija who is chairman of Iraq's National Investment Committee. Al-Ariji stated that Iraq's most

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pressing needs are expanding the oil sector, relieving a housing shortage and infrastructure projects such as airports, hospitals and power plants.

## **Bahrain**

(U) During the Arab Spring, the Government of Bahrain used troops from Saudi Arabia and assistance from other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states to quell the protestors. The martial law imposed by King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa on March 15 continued on into this quarter. However there were still a number of problems that were troublesome.

(U) On April 3<sup>rd</sup> Bahrain's only opposition newspaper, *Al Wasat*, was suspended by the Government and accused of publishing false reports about the demonstrations and of plagiarism. The Ministry of Interior also reported the deaths of two detainees in a government detention center. On April 12<sup>th</sup> two [1.4b] and a Bahraini were put on trial, charged with spying for the [1.4b]. On April 15<sup>th</sup> the Ministry of Justice and Islamic Affairs announced it was seeking court approval to ban Al Wefaq which is a Shi'ite political bloc that happens to be the Government's strongest opposition. On April 25<sup>th</sup> the Government of Bahrain sought the death penalty against seven men accused of killing two policemen during the protests in March.

(U) May was relatively quiet in Bahrain. On May 31<sup>st</sup> King Khalifa called for a national dialogue to try and resolve ongoing tensions. The effectiveness of the national dialogue is open to debate. The assessment is that its effectiveness leaves much to be desired.

(U) On June 1<sup>st</sup> protests again erupted in the Shia-dominated areas of Bahrain. The protests were to demand an end to martial law. Also during this month the state of emergency was lifted. A June 11<sup>th</sup> protest, held without government sanction, went off without incident even though protestors numbered nearly 10,000. On June 18<sup>th</sup> the ban against the al Wefaq party was lifted.

The Government of Bahrain commenced a trial on June 13<sup>th</sup> for 48 medical professionals, including some of Bahrain's top surgeons, in a move seen as harassing to those who treated the protestors. Nine days later the Bahraini Government tried 21 opposition leaders in a special security court. Eight of the 21 protestors were sentenced to life in prison while the remainder received between 2 and 15 years.

(U) Bahrain ended the quarter by establishing the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry to examine the incidents from February and March. The Commission is expected to release their findings by the end of October.

## **Syria**

(U) Former Syrian Ambassador to the United States Walid al-Muallem arrived on May 31<sup>st</sup> for his first visit to Iraq since he became Syria's Minister of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates. He was met by Iraq's Foreign Minister, Hoshiyar Zebari. During his visit the focus of the discussions

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
were centered on building upon the economic pacts and memorandums of understanding that were signed in January by the two countries Prime Ministers.

(U) Prime Minister al-Maliki is scheduled to host a delegation of Syrian government officials and businessmen sometime in July. The purpose of the visit is to discuss closer economic ties, to include the construction of a natural gas pipeline that runs from Iran through Iraq to Syria.

## Economic and Energy Line of Operation

(U//~~FOUO~~) Regarding the Economic and Energy Line of Operation, as detailed in Annex B of the 2010 Joint Campaign Plan (Ref. C), it is the United States' mission to help Iraq build a diverse, stable, prosperous, market-oriented economy that creates jobs and is fully integrated into the global economy. Our goals include: improved delivery of essential services; development of the oil sector; improved key sectors, such as finance, energy and agriculture; macroeconomic stability; and creation of a well-functioning and accountable government administration.

### Assessment



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**(USF-I J5 & USEMB, JCP Assessment 2<sup>nd</sup> Quarter ECG Brief, July 2011)**

(U/~~FOUO~~) The US Embassy's overall assessment of the Economic and Energy Line of Operation at the end of this quarter was that it remained slightly off track but had improved over the previous quarter across the board, with the greatest movement in the energy sector as it moved from RED to AMBER. The embassy highlighted a number of signs that the Iraqi economy was moving in the right direction during the quarter, including the passage of the 2011 budget by the CoR, increasing adoption of airspace control by the Iraq Civil Aviation Authority, oil production levels that hit 2.5 million barrels per day as well as the Ministry of Electricity rolling out an Iraq Electricity Master Plan, awarding new power plant projects, and embarking on its first-ever initiative to privatize a significant portion of the electricity sector.

(U/~~FOUO~~) Despite the improvements, it was noted that there are no "quick fixes" for the electricity shortage problem. The Iraqi power sector is a broken system and an unsustainable drain on the GOI budget. As long as the government continues to be the primary provider of electricity without adequate tariffs or cost-recovery, there will likely be shortages and/or poor quality of service. In the short term, the focus is on getting the GoI to increase supply through increased funding for operations and maintenance, assisting and encouraging the MOE to implement a public messaging campaign to inform the public of the situation and progress towards the solution, and the purchase, installation, and fueling of 4000 MW of HFO-fueled generators. In the long term, the focus is on implementation of the Electricity Master Plan, completion of ongoing GE and Siemens Mega Deal projects, continued refurbishment of existing units, and comprehensive power sector reform that includes privatization of the generation, transmission, and/or distribution systems, assuming the GoI is a willing partner.

(U) The USEMB also noted a need to urge and assist the GOI to manage public expectations regarding the electricity situation. In the past, the GoI has overpromised and under-delivered. While the GoI recently has displayed positive signs that it is attempting to develop a public relations program focused on the electricity sector, it is critical that the GoI continue to get ahead of the curve and let people know how shortages will continue and explain the steps it is taking to address the problem.

(U/~~FOUO~~) A top priority for the US Government is to remain engaged with the Iraqis on fiscal issues given that the GoI is gradually becoming more fiscally independent with rising oil prices. This will be particularly important after the fourth IMF review, scheduled for later in the year. If, at that time, the GoI has earned \$3 billion more than it had budgeted for the first three quarters of 2011, or has projects that will be less than 90% of its 2011 capital budget, the program will be treated as precautionary and no additional funding will be released.

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## Oil

(U) In the oil section, major efforts included the southern crude oil system as well as International Oil Company (IOC) security and business impediments. The southern crude oil system consisted of oil field production increases, off-shore crude export infrastructure, on-shore crude transfer infrastructure, and the common seawater supply project (CSSP) (formerly referred to as the Common Seawater Supply Facility (CSSF)). The oil section monitored the production and development of twelve first and second bid round oil contracts and three third bid round gas awards to IOCs, negotiation of the GoI Basra Gas Company gas capture deal with Shell and Mitsubishi, and planning for a fourth bid round of oil and gas exploration and development blocks.

(U) IOCs continued ramping up production operations to meet their 10% initial production target (IPT), which enables the IOCs to begin cost recovery. Three IOCs successfully reached their IPTs and two began receiving cost recovery Payment in Kind in May. Several other IOCs are scheduled to meet IPT in the 2011 calendar year. The key Iraq Crude Oil Expansion Effort (ICOEE) phase 1 Engineering Procurement and Construction (EPC) contract between Leighton and South Oil Company (SOC) continued to progress with some delay with "first oil" projected in first quarter of 2012. ESD Oil continued working with Foster Wheeler, SOC, the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA), and Japan Oil Engineering (JOE) to resolve design integration issues between ICOEE and Sealine projects. UXO mitigation and dredging continued and off-shore pipeline installation began in May.

(U//~~FOUO~~) ExxonMobil indicated a new pre-Front End Engineering Design (FEED) study for the Common Seawater Supply Project would be tendered by GoI in the coming months as ExxonMobil's remained incomplete, probably due to continues delay payment by the GoI. ESD oil worked with Foster Wheeler, SOC, and the State Company for Oil Projects (SCOP) to synchronize the installation of the on-shore infrastructure with ICOEE timelines. ESD oil continued collaboration with IOCs, us embassy, USF-I J2 and GoI to develop solutions to IOC security concerns as well as to business impediments such as contractual sovereignty, POEs, visa's, etc. In addition, ESD oil worked directly with USD-N and the provincial reconstruction team (PRT) Salah al Din in promoting anti-corruption and anti-smuggling activities at, and around, the Bayji Oil Refinery (BOR) through the city of Mosul with special emphasis on the Hammam al Alil (HAA) pipeline-- ESD oil and us embassy econ developed a joint way forward for USG and GoI to expedite opening the pipeline which made significant progress this quarter.

(U//~~FOUO~~) ESD Oil continued transitioning functions to the US Embassy ECON team. As of 15 May, ESD started passing all outside Requests for Information (RFIs) to the ECON team. ESD hosted their last Energy SVTC on 1 July and stopped attending the CENTCOM SCI VTCs that same day. A single liaison officer will remain embedded with the Embassy ECON team until 1 Nov.

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(U) There were a number of major oil projects that were initiated or finished during this quarter. Phase I of ICOEE is now scheduled for first oil and commissioning during first quarter calendar year 2012. Dredging for a five-subsea export pipeline corridor began in February and UXO mitigation continued. Pipe-laying began in May. Phase I will install four SPMS, but only two will be operational until Phase II, and a fifth from the Sealine project or the MoO. The MoO has yet to select an ICOEE Phase II EPC contractor, which could effectively delay completion of Phase II by at least six months.

(U) In May, the MoO awarded a \$13.5 M management consultancy and engineering services contract to Canada's SNC Lavalin to oversee the initial phase of a planned overhaul of Iraq's pipeline network. The project would link the large southern oil fields with northern export routes for the first time. The initial phase includes a 1.75 mbpd pipeline connecting Basra with a pumping station about 140 miles northwest of Baghdad. There, the pipeline will split, with one route carrying oil about 900 miles northwest to the Syrian Mediterranean port of Banias. A second pipeline will tie into the existing northern export route to the Turkish port of Ceyhan.

(U) On June 5, 2011, the GOI signed final contracts for the development of two natural gas fields—one with a group headed by Kuwait energy company to develop the Siba gas field in southern Iraq with an expected capacity of 100 million cubic feet per day (mcf), and another with a Turkish national oil and gas company (TPAO)-led consortium to develop the Mansuriya gas field in eastern Iraq, which has an estimated capacity of 320 mcf. A few days earlier, the GOI initialed an agreement with Kogas of south Korea for development of the 400 mcf Akkas field in western Anbar province after Kogas's partner, Kazmuniagaz pulled out of the project; this agreement still required council of ministers approval at the end of the quarter.

(U) The CoM this quarter approved a \$365 million contract for a pipeline that will carry natural gas from Iran to Baghdad to meet fuel needs for Iraq's gas-fired power plants. However, the likelihood of completion was assessed as low.


~~(C/FVEY)~~ As mandated by United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1956, Iraq took greater control over its oil wealth on June 30, 2011, opening a new account at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to replace the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) account. The UN established the DFI in 2003 as a repository for Iraq's petroleum export revenues as well as balances from the UN Oil for Food Program and other frozen Iraqi funds. Under the terms of UNSCR 1956, the DFI was terminated June 30. The DFI's dissolution and the end of a requirement for Iraq to deposit all proceeds from petroleum export sales into accounts linked to the DFI constituted a significant step toward closing most remaining UN sanctions imposed on Iraq after Saddam Hussein's August 1990 invasion of Kuwait. However, UNSCR 1956 extends Iraq's obligation to pay 5% of its oil revenues into a compensation fund to pay victims of Saddam's aggression. The GOI's Committee of Financial Experts, headed by President Talibani's Board of Supreme Audit, assumed audit oversight responsibilities for both oil revenue accounts from the Uncreated International Advisory and Monitoring Board (IAMB). The

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IAMB's mandate will end once an external auditor submits a preliminary report of the DFI through its June 30, 2011, closure. UNSCR 1956 also ends the immunity protection of Iraq's oil revenues against creditor claims first afforded under an earlier UN resolution. A long-standing Presidential Executive Order will provide a more limited protection to the GOI's two accounts at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. On May 17, 2011, President Obama extended that order for one year.



#### (USF-I J9 3<sup>rd</sup> Quarter History, July 2011)

(U) The above chart from the USF-I J9 Command History Report for the 3<sup>rd</sup> Quarter of FY 2011, shows Iraq's exports for the third quarter of fiscal year 2011 rose about 95 thousand barrels per day and averaged around 2.2 million barrels per day.

#### Water

~~(C//FVEY)~~ The Iraqi Ministry of Water Resources announced in early April that there was a significant decline in water levels in the strategic Mosul and Haditha dams due to a lack of rain fall as well as a reduction in water flow from Syria, Iran and Turkey into the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers.

~~(C//FVEY)~~ The Ministry of Water resources is allocating close to \$83 billion dinars (approximately \$69 million) to line main and branch rivers in the southern provinces to reduce water wastage.

(U) In contrast to those reports, the UN Food and Agriculture organization said that increased rainfall earlier in the year will result in a decrease in Iraq's grain imports throughout the remainder of the year. The imports are projected to fall to 4.91 million metric tons for the year that ends on June 30, 2011. This is a 6.1% decrease over last year, according to a report from the UN's Global Information and Early Warning System.

#### Electricity

(U/~~FOUO~~) In the electricity section, the main focus this quarter was on tracking short and long term projected additional electricity gains in the GoI region. With a hot summer fast

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approaching, the demand for electricity rapidly increasing, and the threat of public protests escalating; USEMB econ, ISPO and J9 ESD electricity provided briefings to U.S. embassy and USF-I leadership on projected short term electricity gains by summer 2011. The information included additional electricity gained through generation refurbishment, existing generation project completion, and new and existing imported power increases. Additionally, the electricity team monitored the progress of significant planned future electricity projects like the GE megadeal EPC and IPP projects, Siemens and various other plans for new, future generation.

~~(C/FVEY)~~ Originally, the projected short term electricity gains by the summer of 2011 tracked 33,00MW of possible additional electricity capacity. With minimal gains made, the 33,00MW was reassessed. The 2<sup>nd</sup> revision (spring 2011) of projected electricity forecasted 1,404 MW of total anticipated generation by June 1<sup>st</sup>. Unfortunately, by June 1<sup>st</sup>, only 387 MW of the anticipated 1,404 MW of generation had been recovered through repairs and new projects. There were 200 MW of generation refurbishments realized when the repair of Hartha Thermal unit #1 and 187 MW of new generation was added to the grid from both Sadr City GT #1 (157 MW) and "Balad" Hyundai diesel power plant (30 MW). Information gained from meetings with the MoE in May dropped the June 1<sup>st</sup> projection to a total of 1,074 MW. Early June meetings with the MoE moved project completion timelines even later than anticipated. With June 1<sup>st</sup> having come and gone, the focus was shifted. USEMB is now tracking anticipated electricity supply increase by summer's end which equates to over 1700 MW by September 1<sup>st</sup>. The new anticipated supply increase is gained through 712 MWs of generation refurbishments, 704 MWs of existing projects and 300 MWs of imported power. To date, completion of "Ramadi", "Qurna", "Farabi", and "Fallujah" Hyundai diesel power plant added 120 MWs to existing projects. 210 MWs of additional new generation is expected from six other Hyundai power plants by the end of July. Early June discussion with MoE officials indicated a mid June gain of 160 MW from refurbished generation at the Baiji gas turbine power plant. Unfortunately station reports don't yet indicate that the additional generation has been returned to the grid. Future meetings with MoE officials will shed more light on the issue.

~~(C/FVEY)~~ The long term future generation project status for the GOI region moved forward this quarter. The GOI MoE has plans to install 23,990 MWs of new generation with a goal of finishing the projects by 2015. These new generation projects include the GE fast track (660 MW), GE megadeal EPC (4250 MW), GE megadeal IPP (2750 MW), Siemens (3160 MW), HFO fueled diesel combustion initiative (5000 MW) and six new thermal generation sites (8170 MW). On May 24<sup>th</sup> the council of ministers cancelled all four of the IPP tenders involving 22 of the GE frame 9E combustion turbines from the 56 frame 9E's in the GE megadeal. These four projects are being retendered as EPC (engineering, procurement, construction) contracts. Final bids are pending.

~~(C/FVEY)~~ Additionally the 5000MW diesel initiative (2500 MW already contracted with South Korean company: STX Heavy Industries) has been reduced to 4000 MW total. This change

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reduces the total new generation to 22,990 MWs. As of the end of Q3 FY11, 3250 MW of future generation projects have been awarded and 5700 MW of future generation are under construction out of the total 22,990 MW of planned future generation. On June 12<sup>th</sup>, 2011 the GOI cabinet approved \$927 million financing for future electricity generation projects. The funding is 50% of the total cost of the GE Megadeal and Siemens projects plus one additional new generation project with the French Company, Alstom. The additional funding will allow the MoE to shorten the timeline between contractor bid award and start of construction because the letters of credit for these projects are already 50% funded. Additionally, the funding will cover the four cancelled IPP projects that will be tendered as EPC. Finally, it will partially fund a new MoE 720 MW power project with Alstom. To complete the projects, another \$927 million will need to come from the GOI 2012 budget.

~~(C/FVEY)~~ On 25 April the MoE requested immediate Iraqi airport upload support through the US Iraqi Strategic Partnership Office (ISPO) for two 17 ton and one 13 ton jet powered turbine engines at Baghdad International Airport (BIAP). MoE assets did not have proper lift equipment to load the engines onto a Russian cargo airplane bound for Canada where the turbine engine refurbishments would be made. ISPO contacted USF-I J9 ESD who coordinated with USAF 447<sup>th</sup> ELRS (Expeditionary Logistics Readiness Squadron). It was decided to get further guidance and permission from G4S. On 26 April, G4S gave permission for an inspection and load walk to determine mission equipment needs. After a follow up briefing, G4S approved and sent a 10 man detail to do the initial loading. Nine more turbine engines remained at the BIAP cargo yard and on 06 May, seven more engines were loaded. The final 2 engines were loaded on 12 May 11. The repair of these engines is estimated to take approximately 2 months and will return to Iraq to be reinstalled at their respective power station.

~~(C/FVEY)~~ KRG Minister of Electricity, Yasin Abubakir Mawati, announced sending 100 megawatts of electricity to Kirkuk province based on bilateral agreements. Kirkuk's Director of Electricity, Yaljin Mohammad, said the Kirkuk's administration made an agreement with the KRG to import power after the Iraqi Federal Ministry of Electricity [said that] Kirkuk officials could make the deal. To his knowledge, the Kirkuk administration is trying to get 350 megawatts by the end of July and to increase the hours of electricity in Kirkuk from eight to 14 hours per day. According to daily MoE reports, since 22 June 11, power transferred from KRG to Kirkuk averaged 87 MWs. Schematic diagrams of the KRG/GOI national grid show 132kV transmission interconnections between the two regions. Currently, 80% of KRGs electricity demand is being met according to May 2011 KRG electricity data (supply: 1165 MW, demand: 1457 MW). KRG IPP, Mass Global, is expanding generation at its three gas turbine power plants in Dahuk, Erbil, and Sulaymania to provide a total of over 2100 MW of capacity. Additional plans include adding combined cycle generation increasing capacity to over 3300 MW. In the near future Mass Global will be supplying sufficient electricity to fulfill 100% of KRGs demand. Surplus, IPP produced, electricity from the KRG could be another significant source of imported electricity available to the GoI MoE, and may prove to be more economical than other import options.

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## Ports of Entry (PoE)

(U//~~FOUO~~) During this quarter, the National Ports of Entry Directorate Transition Team (NPOED-TT) was focused on two main areas. The first was the fielding and training of Rapiscan and Smith Detections equipment at the Ports of Entry in Iraq. The second was showing the Iraqi Port of Entry leadership how the US conducts borders security, command and control, and integration in a centralized manner

(C//~~FVEY~~) At the beginning of the quarter, there were 13 Smith Detection scanners fielded in Iraq. Over the course of the quarter, the number grew to 64. A cargo pallet scanner was added at the Baghdad Airport cargo processing facility which gave customs personnel the ability to perform non-intrusive inspection of large pallet sized cargo at the airport. The GoI also received 23 cargo scanners and seven baggage scanners allowing for non-intrusive inspection of cargo/baggage for contraband at three Iraqi airports and eight ports of entry. The GoI also fielded 19 walk-thru metal detectors which enabled customs and security personnel to scan personnel transiting airports and border ports for weapons at two international airports and six ports of entry.

(C//~~FVEY~~) Also during this quarter, the COR and the Contracting Office worked to acquire additional funding and a fifth contract modification, respectively. The additional funding and contract modification were a result of the requirement for Rapiscan Systems to provide their own PSD support for transportation and security to the installation and training sites around Iraq. Rapiscan Systems also brought in additional Field Service Engineers (FSEs) to oversee installations simultaneously at different sites. One P45 fixed portal install was completed, along with the Operator Training, at the Zurbatiyah Port of Entry. The report from last quarter indicated that the project had stalled due to the site not being cleared. Civil work and mechanical/electrical installs are in various stages of completion at six of the remaining eight fixed site locations. Also, during this period, Rapiscan Systems began the only Operator and Train-the-Trainer Courses for the Mobile GaRDS systems, centrally located in Baghdad.

(S) Finally, the NPOED-TT sponsored a trip to the US for two members of Iraq's Ports of Entry Director General. The trip was sponsored by the US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) from Washington, DC, Maryland, and Texas. The purpose was to facilitate training on US strategy, processes, and administration used in support of operations which are indicative of air, land and sea ports of entry (POEs). BG Fayeeg, the Iraqi POED Operations Officer and (b)(6) the Al Sheeb Deputy POE Director comprised the Iraqi delegation.

## Air Traffic

(U//~~FOUO~~) The training of the Iraqi Civil Aviation Authority (ICAA) personnel which began in February 2011 under contract with Queen Noor Aviation Academy in Amman, Jordan, finished at the end of this quarter. This training covered technical, administrative and management

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issues. Approximately 250 ICAA employees will be trained. The implementation of the Reduced Vertical Separation Minimum (RVSM) standards in March has already begun to show an increase in Iraq's airspace capacity which is hoped will lead to an increase in Iraqi over-flight revenues according to the 2<sup>nd</sup> Quarter USEMB JCP Assessment.

### **Rule of Law Line of Operation**

(U) The Rule of Law Line of Operation, as defined in Annex C of the 2010 Joint Campaign Plan (Ref. C), seeks to address Iraq's continuing needs through a closely coordinated prioritized effort to allocate US Government (USG) resources to achieve:

- (1) Further integration and security for the Iraqi criminal justice system, including its law enforcement, judicial, incarceration and related legal community support components, and, for the foreseeable future, Iraqi Army and Regional Security Forces (RSF) subject to the rule of law;
- (2) Enhanced judicial capacity and training, including continuing professional development for judges, judicial investigators, prosecutors, judicial security personnel and court administrative staff; and
- (3) Improved law enforcement and judicial relationships and integration of the legal community to address corruption and common transnational criminal threats; as well as,
- (4) Assistance at each level of government for enactment of civil justice reforms which may lead to increased foreign investment and improved economic conditions.

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
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## Assessment

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### Assessment Overview: Rule of Law



### (USEMB JCP Assessment 2<sup>nd</sup> Quarter ECG Brief, July 2011)

(U) The USEMB assessed that Iraq's overall progress in achieving the goals for Rule of Law laid out in the 2010 JCP was —slightly off track” for the quarter that ended June 30<sup>th</sup>. This quarter's assessment was unchanged from the one done in March of 2011.

(U) The embassy highlighted several successes in Rule of Law development such as: judicial security to include delivering an intensive PSD and Court Security training course to 10 selected HJC security specialists; the Jail Operations course taught at the NCTC has developed into an interagency relationship with the Ministry of Interior (MoI) and Ministry of Defense (MoD); and the GOI repeal of Section 136(b) of the Iraqi Criminal Procedures Code which allowed Ministers to block investigations of their subordinates on corruption-related charges.

(U//~~FOUO~~) However, challenges do remain, especially in the area of Iraqi Police (IP)/Investigative Judge (IJ) Integration and Cooperation. A USEMB assessment noted that improvements must be made in the inter-ministerial functioning of IPs and IJs to improve the quality of evidence gathered during criminal investigations and increase conviction rates, thereby enhancing public confidence in the criminal justice system and enforcement of the law

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(U/~~FOUO~~) In addition legislative deficiencies present challenges to modernizing commercial law. The CLDP reports that judges have identified legislative deficiencies, but the legislature does not fill in the holes. The core judges in the commercial law training have raised issues which highlight gaps in the Iraqi code – that legislation is incomplete and outdated in part. One example involves international sales contracts and the identification of remedies available to the parties, such as specific performance or –damages,” that either are awardable in a manner inconsistent with or are unavailable under Iraqi law. These are not areas that can be addressed directly by the courts.

### **Prisoner Abuse**

(U) During last quarter the GoI announced that it was closing Camp Honor which was a detention facility in the International Zone of Baghdad run by the MoD. This detention center had created significant bad publicity for Prime Minister al- Maliki in late January when a string of stories detailed significant abuses in the facility and another –secret” detention facility at Camp Justice. As a result of this issue, USF-I DCG-DO MG Adolphus McQueen met with the GoI Minister of Human Rights al-Sudani. Their discussion was focused on Human Rights in Iraq.

(U) The international organization, Human Rights Watch, stated that the GoI was making progress in transferring MoD detainees to the MoJ. However the structure of the penal system was such that family members were denied access to the detainees. The MoJ currently operates a facility on the site of the former Camp Honor but another agency controls outside access.

(U) By the end of June it was rumored that there were still abuses at the al-Muthanna facility and that yet another newspaper article, similar to the one in January that shed light on the issues at Camp Honor, would be released soon.

### **Forensic Training**

(S/~~FVEY~~) The Criminal Evidence Directorate (CED) conducted training, distributed and installed forensics equipment, issued 1470 Crime Scene Investigation kits and developed a long range planning strategy with the acting CED Director, BG Qussay during the 3<sup>rd</sup> quarter of 2011. MG Munim, the CED Director, continues to recover from an October 2010 attack, but is not expected to return to his position. The Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS) underwent a change of leadership from [redacted] (b)(6) will have the challenge of funding the new AFIS system which currently ends in July, 2011. The highlights of the quarter are the complete installation of the comparatives discipline in the Kirkuk and Sulaymaniyah and the installation of the clean rooms in the Loyalty CED Lab.

(S/~~FVEY~~) There are three primary full-service laboratories located in Baghdad, Basrah, and Erbil. The Baghdad Lab (Loyalty Lab) is collocated with the National Criminal Evidence Directorate (CED) Headquarters. These three labs will have both comparative and analytical

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capabilities. Comparative forensics includes traditional disciplines such as: latent fingerprints, firearms and tool-marks, document comparison, and basic serology. The analytical disciplines include advanced chemistry and DNA. As of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Quarter, Erbil remains the only lab that is processing DNA cases. By the end of the 4<sup>th</sup> quarter, all full service labs will have the required equipment installed and functional. There are two satellite labs located in Mosul and Al Hillah which previously had only a comparative capability and are now in the process of receiving the ability to use the chemical analytical discipline. Al Hillah will also receive the ability to process DNA cases by the end of the 4<sup>th</sup> quarter, 2011.

~~(S//FVEY)~~ The equipment in the five regional expansion labs (located in Najaf, Al Kut, Ramadi, Kirkuk and Sulaymaniyah) have been incrementally installed to increase forensic capacity in the comparative disciplines. Kirkuk and Sulaymaniyah were installed during this quarter, but force protection concerns have been the major hindrance to fully installing Najaf and Ramadi. Al Kut should have a new lab facility completed in the 4<sup>th</sup> quarter, allowing us to assist them in the installation process.

~~(U//FOUO)~~ During the 3<sup>rd</sup> quarter, ITAM Police CED issued 1470 Crime Scene Investigation (CSI) kits to CED labs across Iraq. CED Headquarters in Baghdad is the only authorized trainer of CSI examiners and therefore also controls the distribution of CSI kits. The police and Iraqi Army units that operate at crime scenes are attempting to acquire CSI kits for use, but are not authorized to collect evidence per the CED CSI Director. There is no standard crime scene protocol that is accepted by all ISF units, thus causing many units to collect evidence when not authorized. The current Marshall Law status seems to be causing most of the confusion as to who has the responsibility to collect evidence. This issue is yet to be resolved and may cause evidence to not be able to be used in the courts. This will be a focus area for us during the 4<sup>th</sup> Quarter.

~~(C//FVEY)~~ Finally, the major issues impeding day-to-day evidence processing at most labs is the lack of consumables and a budget. There is no identifiable process for forecasting consumable products in the labs and the use of memorandums to request these consumables is not working. The lack of a budget necessitates that each and every requirement identified incurs a memorandum requesting funding for an individual item. Both of these processes will be the focus for training and assisting in the 4<sup>th</sup> quarter. A conference is planned in Jordan where we will review these processes with the full service lab directors and develop a concept for a way ahead or strategic plan.

## **Corruption**

(U) Corruption remains a serious problem in Iraq but there are measures being put in place to help combat it. The Iraqi Central Bank (ICB) started its first training course this quarter to teach employees of government and private banks to combat money laundering and recognize

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fraudulent checks and bills. The ICB collaborated with the Iraqi Banks League to organize the course which will train 40 employees from various banks.

(U) The Iraqi Integrity Committee has announced its intention to form three committees to investigate corruption and to hold current and former officials accountable for that corruption.

~~(S/ACGU)~~ The slide below illustrates some of the measures that USF-I is assisting the GoI with in order to combat corruption and to decrease the Iraqi public's perception of the corruption present within the GoI.

**SECRET // REL USA, ACGU**

## MIST Anti-Corruption

**Posters:**

- Produced and disseminated by COI office

**Public Service Announcements (TV):**

- 3 Produced by MIST, aired by POTF
- 2 Produced by COI, aired by POTF

**Billboards:**

- 46 nation-wide billboards

**Comic Books:**

- "Generation Now" comic book series
- 50 K Copies produced and disseminated

**Poster themes:**

- Report Corruption
- Fight Corruption
- Move the obstacle of corruption
- Clear out corruption
- Corruption is drowning Iraqis

**Billboards:**

\* MIST coordinates Anti-corruption efforts with the Commission of Integrity (COI) and Anti-Corruption Coordination Office, Iraqi Criminal Investigations and Training Assistance Program (ICITAP)



### (IO Anti-Corruption PSYOP Support Update 2011)

#### Detainees in USF Custody

~~(S/NF)~~ By the end of June, there were 206 detainees in the USF-I Theater Internment Facility at Camp Cropper. This reflected a net reduction of 25,908 detainees from the high point in November of 2007. In 2010 there were a total of 395 releases, 5,619 transfers, and 171 intakes. For 2011 the totals are as follows: 1 releases, 20 transfers, and 7 intakes. The chart below shows there were no releases during this quarter but there were two transfers. During this quarter there were 352 detainee visitations and no law enforcement interviews.

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## Detainee Operations (as of 250800JUN11)



Current Population		
RED	203	
AMBER	3	
GREEN	0	
Unvetted	0	
Total:	206	
Population Demographics		
Enduring Population	204	
CT-20	2	
Total	206	
AQI		104
High Value Detainees		4
American Citizens		1
Third Country Nationals		2
Former Regime Element		7
Shiite		33
Sunni		173
Other Religion		0

As of 250800JUN11

Intakes / Releases & Transfers			
MONTH	2011		
	Intake	Release	Transfer
JAN	5	0	10
FEB	0	0	5
MAR	2	1	3
APR	0	0	0
MAY	0	0	0
JUN	0	0	2
JUL	0	0	0
AUG	0	0	0
SEP	0	0	0
OCT	0	0	0
NOV	0	0	0
DEC	0	0	0
TOTAL	7	1	20

Releases / Transfers by Category	
Enduring Population	1/1
CT 20	0/13
Holdovers from 2010	0/6
Pending Transfers	None
Pending Releases	None
Out of TIF	
Medical	None
Iraqi Court	None

CT-20 Status	
Pending Strategic Release Review Board (SRRB) (RED)	0
Completed SRRB	1
DCG-DO Release Eligible (Green & Amber)	0
Hold or Further Exploitation Required	1
Total	2

As of 250800JUN11  
POC: MAJ McGee SVOIP: 241-8136

IDRC-detaineeoperation@s-iraq.centcom.smil.mil

(DCG-DO Weekly Update Report 25 June 2011)

### Security Line of Operation

(U) The Security Line of Operation, as defined in Annex C of the 2010 Joint Campaign Plan (Ref. C), presents a vision of an Iraq that is sovereign, stable, and self reliant; a nation able to provide for its own protection under the rule of law and is fully responsible for its internal security; a nation that possesses the ministerial capacity and capability for external defense; a nation that contributes to regional stability and is a US strategic partner.

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## Assessment

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### Assessment Overview: Security



Jul 2010	Sep 2010	Dec 2010	Mar 2011	Jun 2011	LOO Conditions
					1: Gol continuing to improve population protection nationwide.
					2: Gol continuing to improve critical infrastructure protection nationwide.
					3: Gol possesses the capability and capacity to sustain pressure on networks in order to neutralize AQI, violent extremist organizations, and other violent irreconcilables.
					4: Iraq providing for its own internal security in addition to developing a foundational capability and capacity to deter and defend against external threats; executed through competent and increasingly professional ISF and security ministries that are governed by the rule of law.

2<sup>nd</sup> Quarter, 2011

On Track
 Slightly Off Track
 Moderately Off Track
 Not On Track
 Not Assessed or No Longer Relevant
 Trending Up
 Trending Down

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~~SECRET // REL FVEY~~

### (USEMB JCP Assessment 2<sup>nd</sup> Quarter ECG Brief, July 2011)

(U) Unlike the Political, Economic and Energy and Rule of Law LOOs which all have a USEMB lead, USF-I is the lead agency for the Security LOO under the 2010 JCP. For the quarter ending in June of 2011, the command assessed progress as "Slightly off track," though – as the chart above indicates – the assessment of one of the four conditions improved this quarter while the assessment of one of the four conditions slipped.

(U) The reason for the upturn in the critical infrastructure assessment was due to the effectiveness of infrastructure security. During this quarter, there were 14 attacks on Iraqi infrastructure. Of these attacks, none were effective in the disruption of essential services. Iraqi Electric and Oil providers are well trained in handling attacks on their facilities, and are able to engage redundant systems or mitigate disruption of services with increasing regularity. There were a number of high profile AQI attacks during the first week in May but these were likely already in the queue and not as a result of the death of Usama Bin Laden on May 1<sup>st</sup>.

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(U//FOUO) The primary challenge identified by USF-I to success in the Security LOO remained the tensions between the GoI and the KRG that contribute to a lack of dialogue on establishing a cooperative Arab-Kurd security arrangement. Other challenges include the lack of progress in getting the Iraqi Police to assume responsibility for policing the cities as well as a lack of capability within the Counter Terrorism Service for exploiting, analyzing and disseminating intelligence. The increased potential for attacks on USF due to the continued reluctance by the GoI to target Shi'a Extremist Groups (SEGs) remain a challenge in addition to the continuing struggle by the IA to field, train and sustain all the new equipment it has been receiving.

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### Overview of Iraqi Security Ministries and Forces

Component	Authorized Personnel	Assigned Personnel
<b>Ministry of Interior (MoI) Forces</b> <small>As of 29 Jun 11</small>		
Iraqi Police Service (IPS)	286,567	264,330
Federal Police (FP)	41,979	40,580
Border Enforcement	41,055	39,508
Oil Police	23,418	28,245
Point of Entry Enforcement	2,123	2,107
<b>* Total MoI</b>	<b>395,142</b>	<b>374,770</b>
<b>Ministry of Defense (MoD) Forces</b> <small>As of 29 Jun 11</small>		
Army	239,353	192,554
Army Training and Support Forces	78,123	64,244
Air Force / Army Air	11,852	7,341
Navy / Marines	6,517	3,648
Department of Defense Civilians	15,337	15,355
<b>Total MoD</b>	<b>335,845</b>	<b>283,142</b>
<b>Counter Terrorism Service</b>		
Special Operations		5,922
<b>Total Iraqi Security Forces</b>	<b>730,987</b>	<b>663,834</b>

\* Does not include Facility Protection Service (FPS) - 98K personnel in MoI

#### Major Initiatives

- KRG security force integration
- Transition of Responsibility of Internal Security to the Police
- Iraqi Army modernization
- Oil and border police training programs
- Doctrine development
- English Language Training
- Out of Country training opportunities
- FMS cases including the F-16

#### Challenges

- "We are on the clock"
- Immature strategic planning, budgeting, and acquisition processes
- Near-term readiness and long-term sustainment capability
- Extended political transition period
- Security Ministry Transitions

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## ITAM-Army Command History\_3rd Qtr thru (30 Jun 11)

### Security Trends and Incidents

(U) While the total number of incidents was higher than in the previous quarter, they were nowhere near the levels they hit in 2010 and certainly nowhere near the 2007 numbers. April was the month with the fewest casualties during the quarter, despite the large number of demonstrations and protests during that month.

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
(U) In regards to security incidents, April was the lowest of the three months with 112 Iraqi civilian casualties and 40 ISF fatalities. May was the worst month overall with the ISF reporting 65 killed and 158 Iraqi civilians killed. In June those numbers dropped with 54 ISF reported killed and 150 Iraqi civilians being killed. Statistically, bombings continued to be the most preferred method of inflicting casualties among the civilians.

~~(S//FVEY)~~ This chart shows the weekly average cover the past 12 months. After a small series of spikes, the attacks are starting to trend downward again.



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## Weekly Attacks by Target



USF-IJS Assessments  
DSN **b 6**

Source: USF-I SigActs through 01 Jul 11 - US & Host Nation Reporting

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### (Weekly Attack and Casualty Trends 20110701 BL)


#### Overall Casualty Trends

~~(S//FVEY)~~ This quarter saw an uptick in US casualties. June was the deadliest month in more than two years with a total of 14 killed. Five occurred on June 6<sup>th</sup> when indirect fire hit FOB Loyalty in the Baladiyat neighborhood which borders Sadr City. The total number of incidents for this quarter was above the previous quarter. The interesting item is that June was the worst for the US whereas May was the worst for the ISF.

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(CUB, 2 July 2011)

## US Casualties

(U) Casualties due to hostile causes were the highest for any three month period since the September to November 2009 timeframe. April saw 11 soldiers killed which equaled the total number of killed for the entire first quarter of 2011. May saw only 2 killed but June saw 14 Soldiers killed, the most since June of 2009. An additional 111 were Wounded in Action (WIA). This was the highest three month period of wounded since the March to May 2010 timeframe.

(S/NF) The chart below shows the weekly average for attacks against US forces in Iraq.


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## USF-I KIA/WIA June 2010-June 2011



(CMII SVTC 110705 Master Presentation Deck)

### Security Planning

(S) After a great deal of planning and preparation starting last quarter for the April 9<sup>th</sup> Day of Salvation event, the annual demonstrations that marked the liberation of Baghdad by US forces in 2003 was a non-event. Although it was believed that Muqtada al-Sadr and his supporters would stage sit-ins and possibly resort to violence, there was nothing like that. The turn-out for the protests failed to meet their billing. Muqtada al-Sadr had called for 1 million and hoped to get 2 million. The actual turnout was even lower than the year before at 29,000.

(S) As the second quarter of 2011 began, USF-I conducted some of its most intensive security planning efforts in preparation for the Arab League Summit (ALS), which was scheduled for May 10-11. The ALS is a very high profile event that the GoI hoped will demonstrate to Iraq's neighbors its reintegration into regional affairs. The Baghdad Operations Center was given overall responsibility for summit security, and had planned to augment security efforts with IA forces and perhaps even Peshmerga forces. Although USAF-I could assist the ISF with critical capabilities behind the scenes, both GoI and USF-I leadership understood the importance of having only Iraqi forces providing the security for the event. USF-I conducted weekly high-level

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joint security meetings with their Iraqi counterparts in the months leading up to the ALS and provided assistance to the ISF in assessing security at hotels, determining Personal Security Detachment requirements, communications needs, surging intelligence support for the summit and other planning factors. The postponement of the ALS until May due to demonstrations and unrest throughout the Arab world had provided the GoI and the ISF additional planning time. However, on May 4<sup>th</sup> Iraq requested the Summit be postponed partially due to the GCC's repression of Bahrain's Shi'a majority. The six-member GCC expressed outrage over Baghdad's criticism of the Sunni leadership of Bahrain and had called for the cancellation of the ALS.

### Significant Security Events

(U) The Department of State Bureau for Diplomatic Security reported on April 21, 2011 that indigenous terrorist groups and Shi'ite militias are responsible for the majority of attacks occurring in Iraq today. The report noted that these groups have increased their attacks since the withdrawal of US forces from the cities.

(U) Improvised Rocket-Assisted Munitions (IRAMs) continued to be a major issue this quarter. An attack on FOB Loyalty on June 6<sup>th</sup> killed 6 US Soldiers and wounded 12 others. Khata'ib Hizbalah (KH) claimed responsibility for the attack. The 1.4b proxies such as Khata'ib Hizbalah, Asaib Ahl al Haq and the Promise Day Brigade have been supporting and directing the Shia militias. These groups have been concentrating their attacks in the Baghdad area as well as southern Iraq.

(U) Although the IRAM attacks garnered much of the attention during the quarter, there were other incidents that occurred that were also noteworthy. The assassination trend that was noted last quarter did not continue into this quarter as there was only one notable assassination attempt and it was unsuccessful against the intended target. The following all were reported during this quarter.

(U) On May 5<sup>th</sup> a VBIED kills more than 20 and wounds 80 in an attack on a Hilla police station. Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) claimed credit for the attack which was in response to the US killing of Usama bin Laden on May 1<sup>st</sup>. Another VBIED attack in the same location the next day resulted in no deaths.

(U) Six policemen, including three high ranking officers, along with eleven prisoners are killed during a 6 hour gun battle inside the Ministry of Interior in Baghdad during an attempted prisoner escape on May 7<sup>th</sup>. Among the dead prisoners is Huthaifa al-Batawi who planned the bombing of the *Sayidat al-Nejat* Syriac Catholic Church in October of 2010.

(U) On May 19<sup>th</sup> a bombing outside a police station in Kirkuk kills 27 and wounds scores more.

(U) A VBIED on May 22<sup>nd</sup> in Kirkuk targeted a police convoy and killed 2 bystanders and wounded 5 police.

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(U) A suicide bombing on June 21<sup>st</sup> outside the provincial governor's home in al-Diwaniyah kills 27 and injures more than 30. Of note is that the attack took place during the morning shift change of security personnel.


(U) An IRAM attack on COS Shocker killed 3 US Soldiers on June 29<sup>th</sup> at COS Shocker.

~~(S//FVEY)~~ The slide below shows that even though the IRAM attacks get the majority of the press reporting, the majority of attacks are still based on improvised explosive devices.



~~SECRET//REL to USA, FVEY//~~

## Casualties by Target and Event Type



USF-I JS Assessments  
DSN (b)(6)

Source: USF-I SigActs through 01 Jul 11 - US & Host Nation Reporting

~~SECRET//REL to USA, FVEY//~~

### (Weekly Attack and Casualty Trends 20110701 BL)

#### Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI)

~~(S//NF)~~ Al-Qaeda remains the most violent of the Sunni extremist groups. Although their logistical networks have been degraded over the past few months, they still remain a viable threat against the GoI, the ISF and the people of Iraq. AQI has retained the manpower, material and technical expertise to conduct sporadic attacks throughout Baghdad though their focus continues to center around Baghdad due to the abundance of government targets, the mixed Sunni/Shi'a population as well as an international media presence.

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(S) Their recent attacks have born this out. At the end of last quarter AQI gunmen stormed a provincial council building in Tikrit. This March 29<sup>th</sup> incident took the lives of 58 people.

(S) The recent attack against the police station in Hilla came three days after al-Qaeda founder Usama bin Laden was killed in Pakistan. The escape of a group of al-Qaeda prisoners from the Ministry of Interior detention center in Baghdad during an attempted prisoner escape on May 7<sup>th</sup> was another high profile incident. However, Huthaifa al-Batawi, who planned the bombing of the *Sayidat al-Nejat* Syriac Catholic Church in October of 2010, was killed. AQI also claimed responsibility for the bombing outside a police station in Kirkuk kills 27 and wounds scores more on May 19<sup>th</sup>.

(U) A series of explosions in and around the Baghdad area kills 16 people on May 22<sup>nd</sup>, most of them Iraq Security Forces personnel. Again AQI claimed responsibility.

(S) The overall assessment on AQI is mixed. The impact of the Arab Spring on the long-term influence of Al Qaeda (AQ) isn't known but has been the subject of considerable media speculation. It would be a hard sell for AQI to sell itself as an organization supportive of the protestors while these protestors call for democracy and dignity rather than the imposition of fundamentalist ideals.

#### **Khata'ib Hizbalah (KH) and Shi'a Extremist Groups (SEGs)**

(U) Kata'ib Hizballah (KH) is a State Department designated Foreign Terrorist Group. 1.4b, 1.4d

1.4b, 1.4d

other groups fall under the Shi'a extremist banner, ranging in militancy from the remnants of Muqtada al-Sadr's Jaysh al Mahdi (JAM, or Mahdi Army), to Asaib al-Haqq (AAH, or League of the Righteous), an offshoot of JAM with some 1.4b, 1.4d that conducts intermittent reconciliation talks with the GoI to Sadr's more militant Promise Day Brigade (PDB).

(S) The focus of these groups for several months has been on attacking US military and civilian personnel, with the hopes of gaining some credit for forcing the US to leave Iraq or at a minimum, delaying the US and Iraqi governments from pursuing an agreement that will extend the presence of the US troops past the December 31, 2011. IDF and direct fire attacks against USF began picking up in the mid- to late March timeframe and continued throughout this quarter.

(S) There were a number of attacks this past quarter by the Khata-ib Hizbalah and various Shia Extremist Groups. An IED attack in al-Kut killed two USF-I Soldiers on April 22<sup>nd</sup>. Four days later there was an IDF attack against Camp Victory. Four days after that attack, an RPG attack wounded three US Soldiers in Najaf. An EFP attack on May 23<sup>rd</sup> killed two US Soldiers. The IRAM attack against FOB Loyalty on June 6<sup>th</sup> was the work of the KH. The attack on COL Shocker at the end of this quarter was also the work of KH.

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Page 38 redacted for the following reason:

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1.4b, 1.4c, 1.4d, (b)(6)

Approved for Release




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## Operation New Dawn

### Operations Order 11-01

(U) OPORD 11-01 was approved by General Austin on 6 January and began execution on February 6<sup>th</sup>. Change 1 to OPORD 11-01 went into effect on May 21<sup>st</sup>.

(U) The operational framework of OPORD 11-01 laid out three Lines of Effort (LoEs) to synchronize military operations in support of the goals laid out in the Joint Campaign Plan Security LOO. The LoEs are: 1) Strengthen the ISF; 2) Conduct Transitions, and; 3) Reposture the Force. The below slide illustrates those LoEs.



(June 2011 OPORD 11-01 Joint Assessment Board (JAB), 19 July 2011)

~~(C//FVEY)~~ Although there are two phases to OPORD 11-01, during this quarter USF-I was still in phase I. The decisive operation for Phase I is the advise, train, assist and equip (ATAE) mission. The priority of efforts in ATAE are: al-Tadreeb al-Shamil (TaS); partnered CT; Iraqi intelligence and logistics development. The MoI ATAE activities will focus on the police in areas where IA units need to disengage to conduct maneuver training, areas around enduring USEMB locations and on or adjacent to MSRs that will be used for USF-I reposturing and redeployment operations. As conditions allow, we will develop provincial police capabilities to help the Iraqi police become the sole provider of internal security. Finally, we will set conditions for transitions to appropriate partners and accelerate transitions where conditions permit. The purpose of these priority efforts is to ensure the ISF possesses the critical capabilities necessary to maintain internal security and develop the foundations for external defense capability.

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
~~(S//FVEY)~~ For shaping operations in Phase I, USF-I continues to develop the foundations for external defense through ATAE with the MoD. USF-I supports the USEMB with military capabilities to enable interagency operations and supports the establishment and mission of enduring USEMB organizations. USF-I maintains presence or engagement in the Arab-Kurd Combined Security Mechanism to provide time for the GoI and KRG to address politically contentious issues. USF-I assists the GoI with Sunni reconciliation through key leader engagements and emphasis on completing the Sons of Iraq integration into GoI ministries. USF-I maintains contact at critical Iraqi C2 and ministerial locations to include operations commands, provincial joint coordination centers, IA division headquarters and other key headquarters. This develops ISF C2 capability and maintains influence and situational awareness. Reposturing in preparation for the final phase continues with the drawdown of excess equipment and the closure of bases. Phase I will conclude on 31 August 2011.



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## Take Aways

- No major changes to OPORD 11-01
- Refinement of 11-01 based upon knowledge of the environment and execution of ROC Drills, OSBs, and Wargames
- Changes have been synchronized throughout the USF-I staff and with USDs, enablers, USM-I, and Service components
- Enabler C2 recommendation gives USDs oversight of enablers during base closure and OPMAN
- USF-I can focus on managing theater-wide intelligence, aviation, sustainment, and movement
- Updates allow USF-I to posture for operational maneuver or respond to any contingency



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~~SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY~~

(OPORD 11-01 Change 1 Brief)

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~~(S//FVEY)~~ It was noted that the internal political situation had changed from the time OPORD 11-01 had been approved and when Change 1 went into effect. The continued violent extremist organization attacks on Iraqi citizens, GoI officials, Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), and US forces, demonstrated that effective political reconciliation of Iraq's numerous factions has not been achieved. Recent demonstrations by Iraq's citizens, an offshoot of the Arab Spring, also highlighted the requirement to improve the GoI's provision of just, accountable, and effective government.

~~(S//FVEY)~~ The Change 1 also allowed for a second look at the progress made by the ISF during the quarter. The credibility and restraint demonstrated by the ISF during recent demonstrations underscored the progress and importance of effective, well-trained security forces in Iraq. It was noted that although the Iraqi Air Force (IqAF) capabilities continue to improve, IqAF will likely field only one of its two programmed Long Range Radars and will not possess fighter aircraft; therefore, the IqAF will have an extremely limited capability to exercise the critical elements of the air sovereignty mission and defend their airspace by the end of 2011.

~~(S//FVEY)~~ A key planning factor emphasized by General Austin several times during the development of 11-01 and driving his COA selection was the need for the plan to retain maximum flexibility. Throughout this quarter, USF-I continued to transition the missions it currently executes to other entities such as the USEMB, OSC-I, CENTCOM and the Iraqis themselves.

### **Task Organization**

(U) This is the task organization for USF-I during this quarter.

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(b)(3), (b)(6)

**(USF-I Phone Chart 19 April 2011)**

**Possibility of a Residual Force in 2012**

(U) When the Status of Forces Agreement was negotiated in 2008 and set 31 December 2011 as the deadline, USG and GoI officials had said the deadline was set for political reasons so that a symbolic end could be put on the US presence in Iraq. However, there had always been an unwritten understanding that a continued US military presence was needed, even desired by the GoI. The Chief of Staff of the Iraqi Army, Babakir Zebari had noted that the ISF would need US assistance until 2020.

(U) During this quarter discussions continued between the GoI and the US over the presence of a residual force in Iraq beginning in 2012. The meetings have taken place at several locations in Iraq, to include the compound of Iraqi President Jalal Talabani.

(U) It has been noted that Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has not publically endorsed an extension for the US troops. In addition, some of his opposition party leaders, like cleric Muqtada al-Sadr have come out against any US troop presence in Iraq past the deadline of the Security Agreement.

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(U) A potential friction point in the final agreement is the issue of legal immunity from the Iraqi court system for any US forces remaining in Iraq. US Troops in Germany, Korea, Japan and other countries enjoy legal immunity from the host nation judicial system. It is believed that any agreement for a US presence beyond 31 December 2011 will contain a clause granting that immunity/

(U) If the US and the GoI cannot reach an agreement on the number of troops to remain or even if there will be a US presence next year, then the only troops left will be approximately 200 housed at the USEMB in Baghdad.

### **Adjustments to the Battle Rhythm and CUB**

(U/~~FOUO~~) Last quarter the USF-I staff made a significant adjustment to its normal ~~“battle~~ rhythm,” or decision-making and briefing cycle in an attempt to streamline the decision-making process as well as to ensure issues were fully synchronized across all appropriate staff entities before presentation to the CG and to eliminate staff ~~“stovepipes”~~ of delivering information. Major outcomes of this change were the elimination of DCG Updates and the Board of Directors (BoD) luncheons, and the institution of a structured series of meetings each week through which information to be presented for decision would flow.

(S/~~REL MCFI~~) During this quarter there were no changes to this format. The current battle rhythm cycle is designed so that the initial staff framing and analysis of problems would continue to be conducted as it had before in Joint Planning Teams (JPTs), Operational Planning Teams (OPTs) and Working Groups (WGs). Once a staff product is sufficiently developed, it is formatted as either an informational or decision brief for introduction into the review process. Each of the meetings shown in the below slide is scheduled weekly, with the intent that a routine staff matter can be presented to the JPOG (1-star review) on a Saturday morning, proceed to the JPOC (3-star review) on the following Monday morning, be reviewed by the Commanding General at the JPOH on Wednesday morning and be presented for final decision before the entire staff at the JPOB on Friday morning.

(U/~~FOUO~~) The battle rhythm and CUB cycle will be reviewed during the next quarter for changes as Phase II of OPORD 11-01 goes into effect.

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USF-I BATTLE RHYTHM

### USF-I BATTLE RHYTHM

Daily	Weekly	Alternating Weeks					
SUN	MON	TUE	WED	THU	FRI	SAT	
<b>Addition:</b> <b>Freq:</b> Weekly <b>Purpose:</b> Synchronize and integrate planning and operations across the USF-I Staff. Serves as the primary venue for synchronization or decision at the OCG level.			Operations Update (0800-0830)	<b>No Change:</b> <b>Freq:</b> Weekly <b>Purpose:</b> Make decisions, set priorities, and provide guidance for plans and operations. Serves as the forum for synchronization across the entire staff at GQ/FD/SIS level			
	Intel Update (0830-0900) CUB (0900-0930) Small Group Huddle (0930-1000)	Intel Update (0830-0900) CUB (0900-0930) Small Group Huddle (0930-1000)	Small Group Huddle (0830-0900)		CUB (0900-0930) USEMB USFI Small Group Huddle (0930-1030)	Intel Update (0830-0900) CUB (0900-0930) Small Group Huddle (0930-1000)	
	JPOC (1000-1200)	JOWICS VTC (A-K; CIVIL) (1030-1200) OSB (1030-1200) IAB (1030-1200)	CG Plans Meeting (0930-1130)		CORE Meeting (1030-1130)	JPOB (1000-1200)	JPOG (1000-1200)
					<b>Move:</b> <b>Freq:</b> Weekly <b>Purpose:</b> Provide CG IPAs on high priority planning efforts and receive CG guidance by Invitation Only	BOD Lunch (1200-1330) IO Update (1230-1315) JFSOCCA/PSEC Update (1330-1430)	
	J-2 CG Roundtable (1300-1430)	STRATCOMM Update (1300-1345)					
		ECG (1430-1530)	CGC (1300-1700)				
Battle Rhythm Sync Meeting (1500-1600)			<b>Topic Change/Addition:</b> <b>Freq:</b> Weekly with rotating subjects <b>Purpose:</b> Provide CG, USFI Staff, Embassy Staff and others SA and common shared understanding on key USFI operations and to assess and synchronize the USFI J1-J2 campaign plan				
	Joint Security MTG (1600-1730)	<b>Addition:</b> <b>Freq:</b> Weekly <b>Purpose:</b> Provide a regular forum for US/Iraq security discussions and coordination * Location rotates between AFP & PUIII					
KLE Leader Sync Meeting (1700-1800)							
					<b>Move:</b> <b>Freq:</b> Weekly <b>Purpose:</b> Synchronize and integrate planning and operations across the USFI Staff and resolve issues or conflicts. Serves as the primary opportunity for full Staff synchronization above the JPJT/AO level		

As of 1 MAR 11

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**USF-I Staff Orientation Training (SOT), 15 June 2011)**

## Strengthen Iraqi Security Forces Line of Effort

## Assessment



**June 2011 OPORD 11-01 Joint Assessment Board (JAB), 19 July 2011)**

(U) USF-I's assessment at the end of June 2011 of progress towards meeting the objectives laid down in OPORD 11-01 for the "Strengthen the ISF" Line of Effort is illustrated above. There was improvement in one area and a worsening in another area but the overall assessment is



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unchanged. The first two objectives are assessed as being –Slightly off track / Manageable problem areas,” which is no different than the previous assessment. However the third area, Border security function and deter malign influence, worsened to –Moderately off track / Significant problem areas / Additional resources required –due to 1.4b, 1.4c groups coming across the border. The fourth area improved to being –Slightly off track / Manageable problem areas.” The Fifth area, US Forces & contractors conducting operations & protected from threats remained assessed as –Moderately off track / Significant problem areas / Additional resources required” due to the high number of US casualties during the quarter.

~~(S)~~ While we remain in Phase I of OPOD 11-01, the decisive operation will continue to be the Advising, Training, Assisting and Equipping (ATAE) mission to strengthen the ISF. During this quarter USF-I continued to focus on Tadreeb al-Shamil training with the 3<sup>rd</sup>, 5<sup>th</sup>, 7<sup>th</sup> and 10<sup>th</sup> IA Divisions, Partnered Counterterrorism with the Counterterrorism Service (CTS) and the Emergency Response Battalions (ERB), and building Intelligence and Logistics capacity

### Overview

~~(U//FOUO)~~ During this quarter assessment of the progress made by the ISF continued. It was noted that the ISF has an unparalleled history of progress over the past eight years of heavy fighting. They are assessed as the fastest growing force with the highest OPTEMPO in the world. With the assistance of USF-I, the professionalism of the ISF continues to grow. They are capable of internal security with some remaining issues which include the following:

- Ability to sustain the force
- Intelligence fusion and sharing
- Finding time to train collectively has been challenging
- Limited external defense capability
- Ability to defend sovereignty lacking

~~(U//FOUO)~~ The slide below shows what the projected gaps the ISF faces over the next year or so.

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## 2012 Projected Gaps and Vulnerabilities

### Gaps:

- Defense of airspace (tactical and strategic)
- Training—new equipment (FMS) and combined arms
- Combined Security Mechanism enforcement
- Logistics
- Intelligence
- Counter Terrorism-Network analysis and targeting
- Sense and Warn
- Maritime security

### Risks:

- Regional nations take advantage of Iraq because they perceive it to be weak
- Regional unrest creates opportunities for malign actors
  - Regeneration of international terrorists
  - Increased funding for illegal militia
- Terrorist and illegal militia shift targeting to the Iraqi people and the Gulf
- Sectarian tensions increase
- Violence erupts because Kurds or Arabs feel threatened

**(Facing Challenges in 2012 CIG Brief to RAND Corporation 01 July 2011)**

(U//~~FOUO~~) The ISF still has a long way to go and still does not have as much key combat equipment as its neighbors when simply comparing military hardware numbers. However, the equipment is of good quality and they are continuing to improve. The slide below illustrates the military hardware that Iraq and each of the neighboring countries possess.

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1.4a, 1.4b, 1.4c, 1.4g

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
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As of 06 Jun 2011

## Al-Tadreeb al-Shamil (TaS) 2011 Training Plan



### ITAM-Army Command History\_3rd Qtr thru (30 Jun 11)

(S//REL USA, MCFI) During this quarter the Iraqi Ground Forces Command (IGFC) hosted and led a TaS Logistics AAR to strengthen ISF logistics by addressing issues and highlighting areas to sustain in order to improve training and combat readiness. The IA Division Logistics Chiefs determined that the top 10 issues were as follows:

1.4a

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


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1.4a

(S//REL USA, MCFI) A week before the logistics AAR was held, the IGFC CoS, sMG Amir, approved the implementation of the proposed USF-I High Value Sustainment Initiative (HVSII). BG Kareem (IGFC G4) briefed the HVSII slide and challenged the Divisions to use this process for the next rotation. Because of problems with the IA 101 system, he then walked the Division G4's through the proper 101 routing process.

(U) The slide shown below illustrates the training status of the IA units that underwent the all inclusive training during this quarter.



(IGFC TaS AAR for 11 JUL 11)

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(U) Our IA partners demonstrated an improved ability to —se themselves” during the TaS AAR by identifying and candidly discussing issues. However, IGFC and JHQ showed little progress to solve logistics and resource issues that linger from the initial rotation. This is unlikely to change without top-level command and staff involvement from both JHQ and IGFC.

(U) It was noted that at the tactical level, TaS units are taking on more responsibility to lead training and IA cadre continues to improve. They are learning “how to train.” 10IA experienced success with designating a TaS OIC to direct cadre, such may be a best practice for others to consider. Although TaS divisions are on track to take the lead, overall cadre lacks depth. Recommend investing ATA to developing and expand TaS cadre to build collective training capability that endures. Commensurate with this, focus efforts to develop and involve NCOs in both units and cadre. Perhaps introducing a master gunner concept is something to consider, especially for units in TaS II that field tanks, artillery, and APCs.

(U) Finally it was observed that the IGFC leadership and staff must follow up with action; reengage JHQ to resolve the issues, most which carryover from the first AAR. Of concern, is the decision to transition to a quarterly AAR prior to each division assuming full responsibility to conduct with no USF assistance. Will this change affect their ability to maintain momentum? What message does it send from IGFC to the divisions?

### Long Term ISF Planning

(S) As mentioned in last quarters’ history report, there was a push from USF-I to develop a comprehensive security campaign that synchronizes with the reposturing of forces that will be going on later in 2011 To date the IGFC is unwilling to discuss or initiate Fardh al-Qanoon (FAQ) V planning since there is no Minister of Defense to approve of such a planning effort. Based on that information and the changing operational environment in USD-S, USF-I initiated a planning effort named LIONS LEAP II. LIONS LEAP II is likely to be the first of a series of offensive operations in southern Iraq to combat lethal aid networks, IED and IDF cells. The intent is to nest LIONS LEAP II with FAQ V and to shape/influence this effort in a manner that integrates with USF-Is combined arms maneuver out of the IJOA, starting with the initiation of Phase II of OPORD 11-01.


(S) The assessment on the long term planning of the ISF for this quarter is mixed. It remains challenging for the ISF to plan more than 6-8 weeks in advance of their operational efforts. The lack of a Minister of Defense, an unstable political coalition/government, and numerous protests regarding the lack of responsiveness, capabilities, and corruption within the Iraqi Government have delayed and reframed the initial USF-I FAQ concept. The current operating environment discourages the IGFC leadership from making long-term plans. J35 FUOPS intentionally started FAQ planning early-on in the calendar year in order to link our Strengthen the ISF line of effort (Decisive Operations during PHASE I of OPORD 11-01) with our Reposture the Force line of effort (Decisive Operations during PHASE II of OPORD 11-01). As the J35 FUOPS relationship

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with the IGFC has grown over the first six months of the 18<sup>th</sup> Airborne Corps' Operation NEW DAWN rotation, a critical lesson learned is that ISF does not plan very far out in the future with regard to operational events. Our emerging strategy to deal with this is to influence the ISF to create named operations such as LIONS LEAP II, so that they eventually develop a campaign plan that nests with strategic and operational objectives. The slide below illustrates that point.



(J35 FUOPS 3<sup>rd</sup> Quarter History report through 30 Jun 11)

### Foreign Military Sales

~~(C//FVEY)~~ As of the end of this reporting quarter, ISAM Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program is tracking 183 Iraqi-funded implemented cases valued at \$6.19 billion. USF-I is currently supporting the processing of 24 Iraqi-signed Letters of Request (LOR) for cases with an estimated value of \$6.98 billion. There are 19 Letters of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) currently awaiting Iraq signatures, valued at \$500 million and three LOAs that have been signed, pending implementation, valued at \$105.6 million.

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~~(S//FVEY)~~ From April through June 2011, Foreign Military Sales (FMS)/New Equipment Training (NET) established a Headquarters at building #510 at Taji. The building was modified adding three additional offices, wiring for SIPR/NIPR connectivity, and signal communications were established to reach all operations on the IA side of Taji. Force protection from the 1-18 IN has been coordinated for all ITAM-Army and LOG Section DoD civilians and contractors. At any one time there are up to 35 (1-18 IN) soldiers escorting and providing area security for DoD civilians and contractors on the IA side of Taji. Numerous KLEs have been conducted with the Artillery Command, Location Command, Joint Base Workshop (JBW) and EME School to ensure continued IA support of De-Processing operations and NET (New Equipment Training).

~~(S//FVEY)~~ The Field Artillery Technical Assistance Field Team (FA TAFT) began OPNET #01 - M109A5 and M198 Cannon Crewman Basic Courses, and UMNED #01 - M109A5 and M198 Howitzer Unit Maintenance Courses, on 15 May 2011. Iraqi soldiers in training included 31 M109A5 Cannon Crewmen and 57 M198 Cannon Crewman courses (concluded on 6 June). M109A5 training will culminate with live-fire training at Besmaya CTC from 30 July-03 August 2011. The Howitzer Maintenance courses are ongoing and will culminate at Besmaya after the live-fire recovery.

#### **Iraqi Army (IA)**

~~(U//FOUO)~~ As of 30 June 2011, there were 196 IA combat battalions conducting operations, as well as 20 Iraqi protection battalions and six Iraqi Special Operations Forces (ISOF) battalions. The force generation of the Counter-Insurgency (COIN) force enablers (Logistics, Intelligence, Communications, and Engineering) was completed in July 2010 and provided the foundation for internal security. Operationally the Iraqi's currently have 14 COIN focused divisions capable of internal defense. The majority of their forces will continue in that role for the remainder of the 2011 and into 2012. The force generation goal for 2011 is to establish a foundational capability to defend against external threats. While the IA continues to make steady progress to build capability it will be challenged to achieve this goal before December 2011. This is due to extended equipment procurement timelines and new equipment training requirements. Specifically, the equipping, training, and combined arms integration of the M1A1 tank, M109A5 and M198 artillery units, and M113A2 mechanized infantry vehicles will continue through 2013.

~~(S//FVEY)~~ The Iraqi Army (IA) continued to widen the scope of institutional and Division-focused collective training in preparation for the expected departure of USF-I forces by 31 December 2011. Collective training was supported by the IA institutional training base of schools and training centers and continued the transition of a COIN focused curriculum to Programs of Instruction (POI) concentrated on building external defense capabilities, training and employment of modernization weapons systems, and Division-level combined arms concepts. Execution of *al-Tadreeb al-Shameel* (TaS I) (all inclusive training) began in January 2011 for modernizing divisions to include the 3<sup>rd</sup>, 5<sup>th</sup>, 7<sup>th</sup>, and 10<sup>th</sup> IA. Preparation and coordination moved ahead to build upon the training and through a long-term collective training

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
plan for modernized units. TaS II Maneuver Collective training will be conducted at the Besmaya Combat Training Center beginning in the fall of 2011. The training base continued to focus on Training Centers and institutional schools while additionally supporting TaS I with instructor cadre, the Armor School providing M113 familiarization training to the 7<sup>th</sup> IA Division, and integration of Kurdistan Regional Guard Brigades (RGBs) into professional development schools and Warrior Training Program cycles.

(U/~~FOUO~~) Meanwhile, COIN-focused IA Divisions continued to attend institutional schools and Warrior Training Program collective training while balancing assigned operational requirements to maintain Iraq's internal security.

(U/~~FOUO~~) The IA institutional training base maintained its core of fourteen proponent and specialty schools located at eight regionally located training centers and one Combat Training Center. Institutional schools included: Administrative Affairs/Logistics, Armor, Bomb Disposal, Chemical, Engineer, Field Artillery, Infantry, Joint Training Center, Medical, Military Police, Maintenance (EME), Non-Commissioned Officer Academy (NCOA), Signal, and Transportation. This training base provided doctrinal and branch-specific professional education for both officers and NCOs. These schools provide the foundation for building self-sustaining professional competency through institutional modernization and doctrinal improvements. The chart below lays out how the institutional training sector impacts the IA.

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### ITAM-Army Command History\_3rd Qtr thru (30 Jun 11)

(U//FOUO) ITAM-A continued to facilitate the integration of Kurdish Regional Guard Brigades (RGBs) into the IA organizational structure. A logistics conference was held in Erbil between the Ministry of Peshmerga (MoP), the Iraqi MoD, ITAM-A and US Division – North (USD-N). Highlights of the conference included the establishment of a convoy and coordination Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) between MoD and MoP Operations Centers. All efforts were designed to improve Arab-Kurd integration in the Kurdistan-governed areas and integrate the RGBs into the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) as a Reserve capability.

(U//FOUO) ITAM-A was unable to hold a joint meeting to develop the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for the Prime Minister's signature and additional Tri-Lateral Agreement, due appointment of key ministers, specifically the Minister of Defense. ITAM-A was able to work unilaterally with the MoP and capture their issues in a MoU which addresses personnel, the development of two Kurdish Divisions, Budget, Military Staff Schools and Social Care. The MoU was provided to the MoD, however in the absence of a new Minister of Defense (MinDef), the MoD Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations placed the action on hold. Strained relations between MoU partners have persisted since the Peshmerga moved into the Kirkuk earlier this

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year. This friction has slowed the MoU progress. Key leader engagements and partnership activities with USD-N restarted in April 2011 and have had great success.

~~(C//FVEY)~~ From April through 30 June 2011, 4,497 Iraqi Army (6 x Infantry Battalions) and Regional Guard Brigade (12 x Companies) soldiers attended WTP at 6 IA Training Centers. This attendance was encouraging since operational requirements in the month of May caused a suspension of training for units in high threat areas of Iraq. This accomplishment was made even more impressive since all training was independently managed and resourced by the IA Training Centers. USF-I and the KRG did combine to provide Life Support Sustainment Requirement funds for RGB soldiers at IA Training Centers. This was required since the IA has not determined a method to allocate LSSR funds to RGB units as of 30 June 11. This remains a future Tri-Lateral agreement talking point for future negotiations.

~~(C//FVEY)~~ By 30 June 2011, 123 M1A1 tanks had arrived at Besmaya Combat Training Center for de-processing. This strategically important modernization program was supported and enabled by ITAM-A to include professionalization of its Armor Officers through the Armor School. A particular challenge remained to integrate legacy eastern bloc armor platforms such as the T-55 and T-72 tanks with M1A1 tanks arriving in theater. This is exasperated by non-complementary communication systems that will present future C2 challenges.

~~(U//FOUO)~~ The M1A1 tanks will be followed by the ongoing arrival of the 155mm Artillery. The one and only Regiment of M109A5 self-propelled howitzers had arrived in Iraq by 30 June 11. The first two Regiments of 6 total Regiments of M198 towed howitzers have also arrived.

~~(U//FOUO)~~ Iraqi modernizing units that attend Collective Training will have previously completed Operators New Equipment Training (OPNET) or Unit Maintenance New Equipment Training (UMNET) for short. The goal is to create platoon and company-level professional competency. Crews for the first M1A1 regiment of the 9<sup>th</sup> Division are expected to have completed OPNET and UMNET by the end of July. Personnel from the 5<sup>th</sup> and 9<sup>th</sup> Divisions have commenced artillery NET for the first M198 and M109 batteries, respectively. The below slide illustrates the progress of their training.

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### ITAM-Army Command History\_3rd Qtr thru (30 Jun 11)

(U//FOUO) In regards to Logistics Operations the United States Equipment Transfer to Iraq (USETTI) program made significant progress building the Iraqi Security Forces as detailed in the Force Modernization/USETTI section. USETTI has transferred equipment via three authorities. The 1234 Authority allowed US Forces to transfer equipment to the Ministry of Defense (MOD) at the General Depot Command (GDC). Of significant note, all M1114 Up-Armored HMMWV's authorized to be transferred to the MOD have been completed. The total number was 335, which have been distributed to the Ministry of Defense. Further, all Section 1234 sourced 7-Ton prime mover trucks have been transferred to the Ministry of Defense. The total number was 133. The below slide from the USF-I J4 Quarterly History Report for April-June 2011 illustrates the transfer of equipment.


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## USETTI Equipment Summary

LoE 3 / OBJ 12 / EFF 12.3 / MoE 12.3.1 – 12.3.5



(J4 Quarterly Report 01 April – 30 June 2011)

### Iraqi Air Force (IqAF)

(U//FOUO) The command continued to assess that the Iraqi Air Force (IqAF) will not achieve MEC primarily due to lack of an integrated air defense capability.

(U//FOUO) The GoI demonstrated solid commitment to air sovereignty plans by delivering an LOR for the procurement of 36 F-16s on 15 June. Since congressional notification for 18 F-16s has been approved, the LOA under development will only address 18 aircraft. The initial cadre of 10 F-16 pilots is training in the U.S. One student completed specialized undergraduate pilot training (SUPT) in June and is now flying T-38s as part of introduction to fighter fundamentals (IFF).

(U//FOUO) From 1 April through 30 June 2011 the ITAM-Air mission remained multi-faceted where advisors worked on dozens of projects to advise and assist the development of the IqAF. Brig Gen Anthony Rock, 321 AEW Commander/ITAM-Air Director, set forth a two-prong set of priorities for the wing and ITAM-Air's mission for this reporting period. The first being the Training and Advisory mission, which is designed to operationalize and jointly integrate Iraqi

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airpower capabilities as well as enable the transition of air base operations and infrastructure to the IqAF and Iraqi Army Aviation Command (IqAAC) while also giving the IqAF the ability to grow and build enduring self-sustaining capabilities. Simultaneously the men and women of ITAM-Air and the 321 AEW continued accomplishing the Operate and Mentor portion of the mission that included: operating airfields and providing mission support; facilitating the operational movement of personnel, equipment and materials throughout the Iraqi Joint Operations Area (IJOA); and mentoring the IqAF and IqAAC across operational and support specialties.

(U//~~FOUO~~) During this reporting period the IqAF commemorated the 80th anniversary of its official founding during a ceremony on 21 April held at New Al-Muthana Air Base, Baghdad International Airport. Earlier that day, the IqAF ushered in an era of its increasing regional capability with the opening of the new Iraqi Air Operations Center (IAOC), located at Hawk Base, Victory Base Complex. With the opening of the \$9 million facility, Iraqi airmen were enabled to maintain internal security and defend against external threats by monitoring and directing ISR assets from multiple sources, providing an instantaneous response capability to any threat.

(U//~~FOUO~~) A fourth successful IqAF Hellfire missile launch took place on April 18<sup>th</sup> which kicked off the large scale joint Lion's Leap II exercise. The IqAF and IqAAC also contributed ISR, airlift, and medevac aircraft to their participation in the exercise.

(U//~~FOUO~~) The IqAF continued to increase its ability to execute mission sorties although there was a slight drop in May due to a contaminated fuel issue that ceased flying operations for their C-130 Hercules and King Air-350 airframes from 6 to 28 May. Despite the setback that month this reporting period ended with a monthly total of 1,089 sorties for June. They flew 879 and 728 sorties for April and May respectfully.

(U//~~FOUO~~) ITAM-Air's formal training courses for the IqAF continued at various locations throughout Iraq. These courses ranged from 13 different technical Air Force Specialty Codes and also included English and Professional Military Development courses. Students enrolled in English training maintained an average very close to the 150 IqAF members per week for this entire reporting period. The average monthly enrollment of students was 340, 416, and 243 for the months of April, May, and June respectfully. The sharp decline of enrolled students for the month of June resulted from the 253 that graduated in May.

### **Iraqi Navy (IqN)**

(U//~~FOUO~~) The command continues to assess that the Iraqi Navy (IqN) will achieve MEC by December 2011, though it will continue to receive new equipment and increase its capabilities beyond that date. However, sustainment and manning challenges continue to be the Achilles heel of the IqN/IqM. Greater consistency in manpower management and a more robust approach

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to sustainability would serve to ensure that their recent good results are not short lived. There is still work to be done and things are looking up.

(U//~~FOUO~~) During this quarter, the focus for the Navy was transitioning the defense of the Al Basra Oil Terminal (ABOT) and residual Territorial Waters (TTW) to Iraqi control. As the force employer, ITAM-Navy's advising strategy to the IqN and IqM required newly delivered Swift Patrol Boats, along with existing Al Faw class and Predator class Patrol Boats, to increase their operational tempo as they assumed greater ABOT sector patrol missions. The IqN also routinely practiced anti-incursion "Smoking Barrel" exercises with Commander Task Force 1.4a (CTF 1.4a) assets. IqN Command and Control (C2) became more active in planning and executing operations. IqM providing point defense of ABOT routinely conducted live fire exercises. And the Scan Eagle intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) spoke was relocated from ABOT to Umm Qasr. The resultant effect was a shift of primary operational defense responsibility from CTF 1.4a to the IqN and IqM. Written concurrence to execute the transition to Phase 1 was obtained from the Iraqi Prime Minister's office on 30 June 2011.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Training saw a continuation of the shift to an oversight role. The IqN implemented a "Train the Trainer" concept that included the ability to evaluate the performance of their training efforts. Their focus was on Swift Patrol Boat crew certifications. The US Marines in Umm Qasr continued their daily training interaction with their IqM counterparts, to include mechanized and foot patrols in the areas surrounding the base.

(U//~~FOUO~~) At the senior levels, weak C2 between IqN/IqM headquarters in Baghdad and the operational elements in Umm Qasr continued to adversely impact execution of a "step change" in the IqN as an institution. ITAM-Navy/Marines began scheduling and executing monthly visits by the Head of the Iraqi Navy (HON), sRADM Ali, to Umm Qasr. We also encouraged weekly rotations of the Deputy Head of the Iraq Navy (DHON), the Chief of Staff, and the Operations Officer to Umm Qasr to strengthen the communication flow between Baghdad and Umm Qasr. The results of these efforts have been encouraging, though there is still work to be done to ensure communications flow up and down the IqN and IqM chain of command, and among peers at each level.

(U//~~FOUO~~) The IqN move to organize its fleet into 3 boat squadrons and the IqM into two battalions, has enabled clearer division of duties and positively impacted mission success. The IqN demonstrated it is adequately positioned to commence the transition to Phase 1. The 1<sup>st</sup> IqM Battalion provided point defense on both the Khor al-Almaya oil terminal (KAAOT) and ABOT, while the 2<sup>nd</sup> IqM Battalion conducted mechanized and foot patrols in the vicinity of the IqN and IqM bases, manning checkpoints, and providing harbor patrols. C2 of both the IqN and IqM at the tactical level is fair to satisfactory and their missions are being effectively executed.

(U//~~FOUO~~) The IqN has 2,672 assigned sailors out of 5,067, which equates to 53% authorized. The IqM have 1,042 assigned marines of 1,450, which equates to 72% authorized. There are 119

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students attending the Arabian Gulf Maritime Academy, and 318 civilian employees. Lack of consistent personnel inflow and outflow represent the largest manning concerns for the IqN and IqM. Presently, they are well manned to perform their current mission. The command is working towards the IqN performing its own recruiting which will allow them to manage their personnel balance. This will become more important as the IqN receives planned Swift Patrol Boat and Offshore Support Vessel deliveries over the next 12 months.

(U//~~FOUO~~) The IqN has a mixed and growing fleet of approximately 60 vessels. Three Swift Patrol Boats conducted missions in their territorial waters, with additional 9 patrol boats and 2 off-shore support vessels scheduled to arrive over the next 12 months. The IqN also utilized its 5 Chinese Predator class patrol boats and its Al Faw class patrol boats to conduct sector patrols. Unfortunately Iraq's four Italian Patrol Ships have remained pier side since March 2011 due to lack of maintenance and resource funding.

(U//~~FOUO~~) In regards to training, approximately 85% of at-sea task training evolutions were conducted by the IqN. Specialized training for intelligence and logistics was planned and implemented. Training of Swift Crews 304, 305 and 306 was completed, and crew certifications are expected to be conducted prior to delivery of the patrol boats. The Iraqi Naval Training Team (IqNTT) now provides approximately 85% of this training, with ITAM-Navy/Marines in an oversight role. A 5-week Afloat Supply Officer Course commenced near the end of June. Squadron engagement and mentoring was conducted on a daily basis by staff visits to the IqN Operations Center, Maintenance and Engineering offices, and Squadron Headquarters

(U//~~FOUO~~) The quarter ended with the redeployment of the Royal Navy and Royal Marines Commandos. The British contingent conducted a hand-over ceremony on 12 May 2011 at the Umm Qasr, Iraq Naval Base which ended their seven year Operation Telic mission. The over 70 person British training train did an extraordinary job in supporting the ITAM-Navy/Marines advise, train, assist, and equip USF-I mission.

## Logistics

(S//~~FVEY~~) The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Ministry of Interior (MoI), have been underfunded for several years and have not executed budgets sufficient enough to support weapon system maintenance at all levels. They must be capable of accurately identifying requirements, resourcing those requirements, executing their plan, measuring readiness, and reacting appropriately. This capability is directly linked to the ability of the Government of Iraq (GoI), including MoD and MoI, to conduct logistic operations. Specifically, to accurately capture requirements, allocate budget resources, execute budget resources, and conduct maintenance and supply operations. To develop an enduring logistics capability within the ISF, a comprehensive strategy was initiated by ISF Strategic Logistics (ISF-LOG). Central to this strategy are coordinated Key Leader Engagements (KLEs), targeted use of Iraqi Security Forces Fund (ISFF) resources, and complementary initiatives designed to enable multiple levels

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of logistics systems. Coordination across the USF-I Staff and US Divisions (USD) to ensure the proper messaging and information flow is essential to the success of the ISF to conduct logistics operations. Multiple actions are required across ministerial levels, directorates, and organizations to obtain required readiness.

~~(S//FVEY)~~ Maintenance and logistics were widely assessed, across all levels of the MoD and MoI, to be among the most daunting challenges facing the ISF. It has become an increasing focus of USF-I's ATAE mission, as developing a functioning system for sustainment is increasingly seen as one of the most significant obstacles remaining on the way to achieving MEC. USF-I's objective for December 2011 is to create enough momentum for the ISF to attain full sustainment capacity and capability in 3-5 years without slipping back after USF-I departs and the OSC-I has the lead.

~~(S//FVEY)~~ For the third quarter FY 2011, ITAM Support Ops made significant progress to complete the processing of ISFF VI requirements. ISFF VII requirements (both in ITAM-Army and overall) have slowed substantially, due mainly to the complications related to the cost-share requirement in the 2011 NDAA. Focus areas included Warfighter FOCUS (WFF), Collective Training, and Asset Visibility & Tracking. Asset Visibility is necessary to account for the large amount of commodities expected to arrive in Iraq over the next through 2013. A robust team of Subject-Matter-Experts comprised of WFF contractors, to support logistics and modernization initiatives, is arriving in-country as of this writing. Finally, Support Operations continues to take the lead on issues related to a smooth transition from USF-I to OSC-I.

~~(S)~~ Equipping and preparing the Federal Police (FP) to take over maintenance responsibilities has been the main effort of the Sustainment Advisory Mission. In early April the ITAM Director of Police met with the Federal Police Commanding General (FP CG) to discuss the Fiafi contract extension for FP vehicle maintenance. The Fiafi contract was scheduled to end on 22 April 11 after being in place for two years. After much discussion it was determined that the FP were prepared to take over the maintenance responsibilities. HQFPTT ensured the final obligations and inspections were fulfilled before the termination of the contract. The Fiafi Maintenance Facilities and tool sets were successfully transferred to the FP on 22 May 11. HQFPTT will put forth additional efforts next quarter to develop a FP maintenance parts acquisition program.

~~(S)~~ MoI made progress to increase the capacity and efficiency of the Abu Ghraib Warehouse (AGW) complex. Operations at the facility have been limited by the inability to receive continuous city power and the lack of fuel for generators at the complex. The MoI made notable progress in receiving, storing, and issuing vehicle parts. Additionally, MoI welcomed our assistance distributing ISFF funded vehicles to the Federal Police.

~~(S)~~ In April 2011, ITAM-MoI Logistics implemented a joint inventory process between USG personnel, MoI Vehicle Directorate staff, and the MoI subordinate unit personnel receiving the items. The distribution plan and the transfer process were laid out through a series of KLEs with

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MG Abdulameer and the head of his Vehicle Directorate. After reaching mutual agreement on the plan, a successful proof of concept transaction was conducted on 2 May. The process worked well and became the standard. Consequently, during the months of May and June we successfully issued 570 vehicles valued in excess of \$95.6M to the MoI HQ and various elements of the Federal Police Sustainment Brigade, General Counter-Explosive Directorate, and the Oil Police.

### **Iraqi International Academy (IIA)**

(U/~~FOUO~~) This past quarter, the IIA program continued to proceed with the course of action and plan of action and milestones developed in January 2011. The plan involved migrating existing capabilities at the Iraq's National Defense University (NDU), National Defense College (NDC) and Iraq War College (IWC) to the program site upon completion of construction and renovation in October 2011 and the establishment of a new strategic studies center called the Mesopotamia Center for Defense and Strategic Studies. Efforts this past quarter involved working in concert with the NATO Training Mission-Iraq (NTM-I) (advisors to Iraq's NDU, NDC and IWC – all future IIA program site tenants), to ensure full utilization of site capacity while working to ensure existing and planned staff and student body numbers are consistent with planned office and class space at the site.

### **Ministry of Interior**

(U/~~FOUO~~) This quarter has shown steady improvements in ministerial-level processes, particularly in the areas of the Directorate of Planning and Tracking's 2012 to 2016 Strategic Planning effort, human resources professional development, and developing a strategy to improve the manning of Ministry of Interior (MoI) forces.

(S/~~FVEY~~) As of 30 June 2011, 564,152 personnel were assigned to MoI. 280,451 were provincial police forces (Iraqi Police (IP) and Iraqi Civil Defense Directorate); 222,753 federal forces (Federal Police (FP), Department of Border Enforcement (DBE), Points of Entry Directorate (PoED), Facilities Protection Services (FPS), Oil Police and Electricity Police); and 60,948 in the Ministry Headquarters and its functional force directorates.

(U/~~FOUO~~) In April, Iraqi Training and Advisory Mission (ITAM) - Ministry of Interior (MoI) Human Resources (HR) completed the fifth of a six phase training initiative designed to provide professional development and international human resources training to MoI and Kurdish Regional Government (KRG). During this quarter, one MoI and 17 KRG officers participated in Human Resources Competency Training. This training was instructed by six MoI officers and one MoI civilian who were all accredited instructors certified to train ISF personnel. MoI used the train-the-trainer (T3) method to implement the training, and intends to continue this process to sustain the training into the future. The course covered fundamentals of human resource management, merit-based hiring, leadership development, performance management,

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establishing business partnerships and force management. These 18 officers joined the ranks of 53 MoI and one KRG personnel who were previously trained as human resources certified professionals. Finally, one of the most positive outcomes of this training was the professional and social connections established between these professionals that will have a long-lasting impact.



## Mol - Today's Capabilities and Challenges

<u>Snapshot</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Basic capability exists with increasing maturity to administer and manage the force</li><li>• Investing in systems for HR, logistics and financial management</li><li>• Multi-year Strategic Planning Effort (b)(6)</li><li>• Logistics system is immature and bureaucratic with little delegation</li></ul>	<u>Capabilities</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Engaged high-level leadership</li><li>• Invested in an HR and payroll management info system</li><li>• Improving ministerial (corporate) business management processes and systems for financial management, strategic planning, human resources and comms/IT</li><li>• Adjudicate internal disciplinary complaints</li><li>• Internal security force court process – fair, predictable, and evidence-based</li><li>• Annual investment in sustainment</li><li>• Established a national logistics and maintenance center</li><li>• Strategic Program Planning linked to annual operating budget w/a fledgling execution process</li><li>• Active Inspector General processes and systems</li><li>• Acknowledge training is critical for building the future</li></ul>
<u>Challenges</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• No ministry spokesman</li><li>• MoI struggles to maintain the equipment and infrastructure we have built or provided</li><li>• Exponential growth of budget and personnel over past seven years</li><li>• Contracting is hampered by bureaucratic processes and individual desires</li><li>• Limited budget authorities tied to CPA rules</li><li>• Increasing managerial complexity</li></ul>	

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(ITAM Quarterly Roundtable 30 APR 11)

(U//~~FOUO~~) The eMinistry project began the data collection and training phases with briefings to all the directorates and agencies and began the process of ensuring data was gathered and collated in the proper form. The eMinistry system was designed and configured. The User Acceptance test was conducted by the MoI from May 15<sup>th</sup> through the 19<sup>th</sup>. A final presentation was delivered to the MoI leadership on 22 May to demonstrate the system and compare the payroll run through eMinistry to information produced using the previous manual process. Effective beginning June 1, the system was ready for day-to-day use as the MoI's production payroll system. Directorates were assigned suspense dates for data submission to the contractors, and personnel continued with data validation and cleansing before entering data into the

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production system. As of the end of the quarter, two agencies had not completed data submission: National Iraqi Intelligence Agency (NIIA) and the administrative agencies. The deadlines were extended to July 2011.

(U/~~FOUO~~) In support of eMinistry, ITAM-MoI HR sponsored a technology training conference in Amman, Jordan, for leaders of the MoI's eMinistry project. The conference included three days of briefings, as well as one day for a demonstration of the Jordanian Ministry of Interior's system. The entire event was very successful, as these leaders gained an appreciation of the scope and capabilities of eMinistry. A US-funded six-month extension of the consultant contract went into effect 1 June 2011 in order to ensure complete implementation and training of eMinistry for turnover of the system by 30 November 2011.

(U/~~FOUO~~) The Ministry of Interior re-established its Recruiting Directorate and assigned a Brigadier General as the General Director. Additionally, the directorate tested an online job application system. It was an overwhelming success. More than 82,600 applications were received for 18,371 positions. Access to the on-line application had to be suspended due to the excessive number of applications. The suspension allowed the directorate to process the applications.

(U/~~FOUO~~) The 2011 MoI Salaries and Retirement bill progressed through the parliamentary process, with successful first and second readings as well as markups from the Council of Ministers. This legislation was designed to resolve a long-standing discrepancy regarding the total compensation between Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defense personnel. By the end of this quarter, the proposal was pending a final reading and vote by the Parliament to become law.

(U/~~FOUO~~) Finally, Prime Minister al-Maliki directed the Ministry of Interior to reduce its headquarters staff by 30% and reassign those individuals to police forces positions. The purpose was to cut overhead and increase the number of police available for duty at the tactical level to help secure and stabilize Iraq. This directive will be implemented immediately and is not negotiable. Senior MoI leaders are expected to implement this decision after internal consultations.

### **Iraqi Police (IP)**

(U/~~FOUO~~) In the 3<sup>rd</sup> quarter of FY 2011, ITAM Police Professional Training trained more than 26,000 Iraqi Police, Federal Police, Border Enforcement, Ports of Entry Enforcement, Emergency Response Battalion, Facilities Protection Services, Forest Police, Iraqi Civil Defense, Internal Affairs, Customs, Electric Police, Oil Police, National Intelligence Agency, Zerevani (Kurdish Region Federal/Provincial Police) and other special category forces personnel with a total of more than 745,000 students trained to date.

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Under Operation NEW DAWN, more than 275 Civilian Police Advisors contributed to ATAE efforts under the control of three U.S. Divisions, seven Advise and Assist Brigades and USF-I/ITAM-Police.

(U//~~FOUO~~) The Training and Qualification Institute (TQI) planning effort has improved with new leaders dual-hatted from Training Affairs to Planning & Tracking and Administration & Finance. TQI is preparing for the new MoI law that will shrink the number of Directorate Generals within MoI and realign budgets. This will legally realign BPC and HISAD as departments under TQI's administration and budget authority. TQI continues to work with MoI's Planning & Tracking on the 2012-2016 strategic plans for right-sizing the training base and best utilization of MoI training centers. TQI has become a leader in the collaboration with other GoI and International agencies for women equality, ethics and human rights, domestic violence and human trafficking. Recent legislation will open the Officer 3-year College and the 2-year Commissioner program to women. TQI training centers continue to review and update their curriculum however TQI level management and distribution is still lacking.

(U//~~FOUO~~) However, their greatest challenge is the management of critical life support contracts. These contracts have been stalled at MoI by MG Jawad (Technical Advisor to PM). If the food service and facility maintenance contracts are not resolved soon – the campus will not be able to receive the 7,000 plus students returning in September for fall semester. The rain water distribution system and paving of the High Institute is another contract that is three years in waiting with no resolution. The US funded phase II construction project is also several years behind schedule. The project was earlier schedule to be completed in August 2011 in time for planned expansion during fall semester. The rain water distribution and sewer system had to be redesigned and the completion date has slipped to November 2011. This project (2,000 beds and 2,800 seats) is desperately needed to replace dilapidated facilities and meet the growing the number of students.

(U//~~FOUO~~) The Baghdad River Patrol Training Center continued to serve as a nationally recognized venue. The training center held four training courses including two Waterborne Operations courses that consisted of 43 students, one Search and Recovery Diver course that graduated 18 students and one Outboard Engine Repair course with 9 students from Iraqi provinces.

(U//~~FOUO~~) ITAM Police also continued actions in coordination for the shipment and distribution of \$4.5 million dollars of Police Training Aids destined for 36 Iraqi Police Forces Training Centers throughout Iraq including the Kurdish Region. Fifteen training centers were issued their training aids this quarter.

(U//~~FOUO~~) During this quarter, the third shipment of the ISSF VI Explosive Detection Dog's (EDD) arrived and began training in the MOI K9 Directorate with 39 new Iraqi Police K9 teams. Following a rocky start that included a K9 dying from heat exhaustion at the Baghdad Police

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College in June, twelve Iraqi veterinarians and nine vet technicians were assigned to this cycle of training. The course will graduate at the end of July 2011. Following the Ramadan break in August, the last US-supported course will start in mid-September and finish in November 2011. The ISSF V purchase of 145 EDD's has been completed; pending the replacement of one K9 that was rejected for medical issues. The Iraqi leadership has expanded K9 distribution to include Patrol Police who trained eight handlers in the Apr-May course. Patrol Police built kennels which are adequately housing the K9.

### **Joint Headquarters**

~~(S//FVEY)~~ The Joint Headquarters remained largely inactive during this quarter due to the lack of a Minister of Defense. As a result, the only way to implement actions was to forward recommendations to the Prime Minister, which proved to be a very cumbersome administrative process. Therefore, most actions were shelved to 'wait for a Minister'. There was no indication of any significant delegation by the Prime Minister to the Joint Headquarters for execution of Ministerial tasks. In fact, the lack of a Minister appeared to more centralize the operations of the Ministry of Defense, rather than de-centralize actions to a lower level.

~~(S//FVEY)~~ There was also significant evidence of further degradation of the command and control structure of the Joint Headquarters, with the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations becoming a direct report to the Prime Minister, the Intelligence Directorate (M2) of the Joint Headquarters becoming an independent intelligence organization for the Prime Minister's office, and the Iraqi Ground Forces Command (IGFC) receiving orders that they no longer reported to the Joint Headquarters, but rather directly to the Prime Minister.

~~(U//FOUO)~~ The two main objectives of the Joint Headquarters leadership in this quarter were the development of a 2012 gap study for the Prime Minister and the execution and prioritization of the 2011 budget for the Ministry of Finance. This Prime Minister, as acting Minister of Defense, tasked the former Minister of Defense to explain what defense gaps would exist after the withdrawal of US troops and tasked the Chief of Staff to develop a 2012 – 2014 budget projection, with emphasis on sustainment of equipment. The gaps study was headed by the Chief of Staff and the budget study was headed by the Vice Chief of Staff.

~~(U//FOUO)~~ The Chief of Staff formed a committee of all the service chiefs and the Joint Headquarters deputies to identify the gaps and to make recommendations on how they should be covered. The study was performed under the supervision of the former Minister of Defense. Recommendations were made in the areas of budget, procurement, and support from US forces in order to cover all the identified gaps. All the service chiefs, Deputy Chiefs of Staff, Vice Chief of Staff and Chief of Staff signed the completed study. The study was given to the Prime Minister by the former Minister of Defense but has yet to be formally presented outside of the Ministry of Defense.

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(U//~~FOUO~~) The Vice Chief of Staff implemented a Joint Committee that included the Joint Headquarters, Military Services and participation by the Director General for Policy and Requirements and the Director General for Intelligence. The committee used the term 'Joint Readiness Committee'.

(U//~~FOUO~~) The Joint Headquarters also struggled with a complex command and control issue concerning the management of Air Defense, with a new Air Defense Directorate being established under the DCOS (Operations) and then the Prime Minister directing that air operations and management of the airspace be removed from the Air Force and transferred to the Air Defense Directorate. This order was to include the long range radars constructed by the US for airspace management

### **Merging of Kurdish Security Forces and ISF**

(U//~~FOUO~~) USF-I continued to facilitate the integration of Kurdish Regional Guard Brigades (RGBs) into the IA organizational structure as a reserve capability. USF-I and the KRG did combine to provide Life Support Sustainment Requirement funds for RGB soldiers at IA Training Centers. This was required since the IA has not determined a method to allocate LSSR funds to RGB units as of 30 June 11. This remains a future Tri-Lateral agreement talking point for future negotiations. One of the highlights from this quarter included the establishment of a convoy and coordination Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) between MoD and MoP Operations Centers. All efforts were designed to improve Arab-Kurd integration in the Kurdistan-governed areas and integrate the RGBs into the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) as a Reserve capability.

(U//~~FOUO~~) RGB training was fully integrated into the 2011 IA Master Training Calendar and began as scheduled. Specialty training expanded into proponent schools for Officers and NCOs including the Company Commander, Medical, Infantry and Intelligence Courses. This training occurred at Iraqi Army Schools and Training Centers, located outside of Peshmerga controlled areas, demonstrating increased acceptance of ethnic diversity.

(U//~~FOUO~~) The RGB Second Set Letter of Request (LOR) draft was completed on 29 June 2011. ITAM-Army scrubbed the equipment list for accuracy and cost effectiveness with the support of ISAM personnel. This LOR included equipment training, deprocessing, field services representation and spare parts services that were not included in the first RGB LOR. The estimated total cost is approximately \$143M. ITAM-A provided details regarding the type of training and services required for the new equipment and collective training. The estimated approval date is mid-August 2011. The equipment for the RGB will facilitate the integration of these forces into the Iraqi Security Forces.

(U//~~FOUO~~) The police training programs continued to be used to break down Arab-Kurd barriers. ITAM Police was able to coordinate for the shipment and distribution of \$4.5 million

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dollars of Police Training Aids destined for 36 Iraqi Police Forces Training Centers throughout Iraq including the Kurdish Region. Fifteen training centers were issued their training aids this quarter.

((U//~~FOUO~~) One issue that came up this quarter was that ITAM-A was unable to hold a joint meeting to develop the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for the Prime Minister's signature and additional Tri-Lateral Agreement, due appointment of key ministers, specifically the Minister of Defense. ITAM-A was able to work unilaterally with the MoP and capture their issues in a MoU which addresses personnel, the development of two Kurdish Divisions, Budget, Military Staff Schools and Social Care. The MoU was provided to the MoD, however in the absence of a new Minister of Defense (MinDef), the MoD Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations placed the action on hold. Strained relations between MoU partners have persisted since the Peshmerga moved into the Kirkuk earlier this year. This friction has slowed the MoU progress. Key leader engagements and partnership activities with USD-N restarted in April 2011 and have had great success.

## Conduct Transitions Line of Effort

### Assessment



(June 2011 OPOD 11-01 Joint Assessment Board (JAB), 19 July 2011)

((U//~~FOUO~~) USF-I's assessment at the end of June 2011 of progress towards meeting the objectives laid down in OPOD 11-01 for the "Conduct Transitions" Line of Effort is illustrated above. The first objective, enabling the US Mission-Iraq to conduct missions, is assessed as being on track. This as an improvement over the assessment provided at the end of the last quarter. Two other assessments remain the same from the previous quarter. Efforts to establish the OSC-I are still being assessed as "Moderately off track / Significant problem areas / Additional resources required." The command assessed no problems with its progress towards transitioning activities to its partners in DoS and USCENTCOM with proper authorities and agreements. The area of establishing a cooperative security mechanism between Arabs and Kurds in the Disputed Internal Boundary areas of northern Iraq is being assessed as "Moderately

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off track / Significant problem areas / Additional resources required” which is a noteworthy improvement.

## **General**

(U/~~FOUO~~) The task of transitioning the enduring activities currently performed by USF-I to the USEMB is extremely complex. The US Embassy in Iraq, which is already the largest US embassy in the world, continued with its planned expansion from 8,000 to 17,000 in 2011-12 in order to be able to build and maintain a multi-faceted and lasting partnership between the United States and Iraq.

(U/~~FOUO~~) The post-2011 US presence in Iraq remained a politically sensitive issue for the GoI leadership this quarter, as did any discussion of residual military forces after 2012. Prime Minister al-Maliki's tenuous political situation left him unwilling to challenge the Sadrist Trend on many of their positions, including their opposition to both a US military presence and an extensive diplomatic presence in Iraq past 2012. Therefore, the planned doubling of the size of the US Embassy staff and the construction of a number of consulates, branch offices, OSC-I and INL sites were delicate issues of negotiation.

(C/~~FVEY~~) In early April Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari related to US Ambassador James Jeffrey that he sought clear instruction from Prime Minister al-Maliki in regards to his desires to have the US maintain a presence past the December 31<sup>st</sup> 2011 deadline. It was also noted that Zebari, the Deputy Prime Minister Rowsch Shaways and Kurdistan Regional Government President Masoud Barzani had been clear with al-Maliki that Iraq ~~needed~~ the US to stay in Iraq. According to Zebari, Maliki's response was that it was most definite that the US needed to stay. The topic was of such sensitivity that Zebari advised Ambassador Jeffrey that any documents presented should avoid mentioning certain key phrases such as airports or branches. Zebari also suggested to Ambassador Jeffrey that he remove any mention of what he called ~~former U.S. bases.~~ His comment was that without the language changes, the document would raise suspicions that the Embassy's plan was simply military engagement hidden in the diplomatic mission.

(U/~~FOUO~~) During this quarter USF-I continued to work with our USEMB partners in order to provide support of the US mission in Iraq. One example was that Department of State personnel recently completed a 40 hour course on initial MRAP driver training conducted by USF-I trainers. The five day course of instruction included rollover training as well as day and night driving. This training resulted in 30 DOS personnel being licensed to operate the Caiman Plus variant of MRAP. DOS plans to train an additional 270 personnel to operate the MRAPs. Along that line in April DOS took possession of its first five Caiman Plus vehicles.


(U/~~FOUO~~) During this quarter there were a series of Rehearsal of Concept (ROC) drills performed that focused on the bases that will have an enduring Office of Security Cooperation-

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Iraq (OSC-I) presence. The slide below depicts the enduring sites and what facilities they have available. These ROC drills examined the critical operations at each location so that gaps could be identified and USF-I and EUSEMB could synchronize the expected initial operating procedures. These drills became more important as OSC-I hit their initial operating capability on June 1<sup>st</sup>.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Finally, one of the key transitions this quarter was the beginning of the transition of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT). The impending closure of the PRTs will have a significant impact upon USF-I. General Austin noted that among their many functions, they provided situational awareness to USF-I. He cautioned that level of situational awareness was likely to decline as the PRTs shut down over the next few months.



(MG Cardon CENTCOM Brief 17 June 2011)

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## Planning

(S) Following the Iraq Senior Leaders Transition Conference last quarter, USF-I and USEMB planners continue to work jointly with USCENTCOM planners this quarter to conduct the ongoing mission analysis for the Iraq Country Plan, USCENTCOM's document for how DoD will support the Embassy in 2012. It was determined that a combined mission analysis would allow for better understanding of the resource requirements, the US government programs and agencies working in Iraq as well as areas where increased inter-governmental coordination is required. Although the Iraq country plan was supposed to be published at the end of this quarter, it was pushed back to the next quarter.

(U) During the last quarter, OSC-I had reshaped into working groups. The OSC-I (TT) Command History Report for this quarter states that OSC-I (TT) reshaped into five working groups focused on three critical planning areas related to the standup of OSC-I and the drawdown of the DCG (Advising & Training):

**--Command Working Group.** The Command Working Group provided the leadership for a highly specialized team responsible for influencing, facilitating and communicating strategic initiatives to establish long-term US-Iraqi security cooperation and partnership programs designed to assist Iraq to become a secure, sovereign, and self-reliant nation. They provided guidance and coordinated the development of the Concept Plan for the OSC-I and made recommendations for other aspects of US presence required to achieve the intent of the Strategic Framework Agreement.

**--Ops/Plans/C2 Working Group.** The Ops/Plans/C2 Working group was instrumental in crafting OPRD 11-01 and 11-01 Change 1. They coordinated with J5 at USF-I, CENTCOM, and JCS levels as well as the embassy to ensure that the transition from USF-I to OSC-I was a workable plan.

**--Manning Working Group.** The Manning Working Group created and continuously reshaped the structure of the 157 members of the OSC-I until an acceptable solution was reached that was approved by all stakeholders. The final organizational structure included 118 Military Personnel, 9 Civilians, and 30 Locally Employed Staff.

**--Basing Working Group.** The Basing Working Group was responsible for everything that would be necessary to support the 157 OSC-I members. Originally, there were to be four locations, but a fifth site was added and then Kirkuk which was originally a DoS site was given to OSC-I to operate as a combined location as well.

**--Roadmap/Reshaping Working Group.** The Roadmap/Reshaping Working Group was focused on the transition of A&T into OSC-I. This was not only a matter of manning but also philosophy and changing the way things are organized and accomplished all the while continuing to accomplish the OSC-I mission.

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## Looking Ahead: OSC-I and INL

(U//~~FOUO~~) Currently we are on plan for June, showing moderately off schedule as we maintain operational flexibility. OSC-I achieved the objectives set forth in OPORD 11-01 and by the DCG (A&T) for initial operational capability on July 1<sup>st</sup>. OSC-I is also on track to achieve full operational capability no later than October 1<sup>st</sup>. Some challenges from outside agencies continue, but progress has also been made since last month. The OSC-I continues to receive great support from the team-of-teams: USF-I J-staff, the Embassy and Divisions.

(S//~~FVEY~~) The transition of the enduring Programs, Processes and Activities is behind the approved schedule. Twenty Five percent of the 3<sup>rd</sup> quarter tasks have been delayed to the 4<sup>th</sup> quarter, but now have defined transition organizations. The publication of the Iraq Country Plan has also been delayed from June to July, with the vital OSC-I Security Cooperation Annex delayed until mid-August. USF-I J5 has created a working group to support CENTCOM's Iraq Country Plan Annex development



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### Objective 8: Transition Activities from USF-I to Partners



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~~(S//FVEY)~~ There are still challenges remaining. One of the most important challenges is that the Department of State perimeter may not meet the 01 October 2011 full operational capability deadline. This could prevent the sites from being occupied on that date. However there is planning underway to develop a mitigation strategy. In addition only 38 of the projected 125 up-armored vehicles will be available on the 01 October date. There is currently a discussion ongoing to see if perhaps USF-I could make up the shortfall in capacity. Finally, with budget issues taking to the fore, it is possible that the reduction in the FY 2012 Department of State budget may impact many of these sites.



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### Objective 8: Transition Activities from USF-I to Partners



July 11	Aug 11	Sept 11	Oct 11	Nov 11	Dec 11
<b>Police</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Training Centers and Academies</li><li>• Counter Explosives</li><li>• National Forensic Program</li></ul>	<b>Police</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Criminal Evidence</li><li>• Investigations</li><li>• Law Enforcement Intelligence Support</li></ul>	<b>Police</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Police Force Leadership</li><li>• Advisory Mission</li><li>• Critical Infrastructure Protection</li><li>• Border Security</li></ul>	<b>Transfer Criteria</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Capability</li><li>• Delivery of Equipment</li><li>• Re-Posturing Actions</li><li>• Right Seat Ride</li></ul>		
<b>Mail</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Public Relations</li><li>• Finance</li><li>• Human Resources</li><li>• Rule of Law (IA, IG, Human Rights)</li></ul>		<b>Mail</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Communications</li><li>• IT</li><li>• Logistics</li><li>• Maintenance</li><li>• Sustainment</li><li>• Planning</li></ul>	<b>USE (ATAE) Efforts Through EOM</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• MOI Logistics Advising</li><li>• KRG Integration</li><li>• Borders and Ports</li><li>• Federal Police Force Generation</li><li>• Senior Leader Advising</li></ul>		
<b>Enduring Functions to Transfer:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• 10 Ministerial Functions</li><li>• 10 Police Functions</li></ul>					

#### Three key challenges

- ☐ DoS Perimeter Security may not meet 1 Oct 11 Mission Capable date
  - Could prevent occupation
  - Developing mitigation measures
- ☐ Project 38 of 125 Up-armored vehicles to meet RSO requirements on 1 Oct 11
  - Determining alternative options
  - Determining feasibility of USF-I providing this capability
- ☐ Impact of DoS FY12 budget reduction on INL PDP

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(07 April 2011 CUB)


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## Reposture the Force Line of Effort

### Assessment




(June 2011 OPOD 11-01 Joint Assessment Board (JAB), 19 July 2011)

(U//~~FOUO~~) USF-I's assessment at the end of March 2011 of progress towards meeting the objectives laid down in OPOD 11-01 for the "Reposture the Force" Line of Effort is illustrated above. All three objectives currently being assessed are viewed as "Slightly off track / Manageable problem areas." The fourth objective, conducting operational maneuver, will not be assessed until Phase II of the campaign begins on or about 1 September. However, prior to that time the plan calls for the gradual drawdown of equipment and bases – though not significant numbers of personnel – in order to reduce the logistical burden anticipated during the final four months of 2011.

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## Disposition of Forces



(Staff Orientation Training, J3 Directorate 18 June 2011)

~~(S//FVEY)~~ The USF-I force disposition did not change this quarter. The basic construct of USF-I was based on three US Divisions commanding six Advise and Assist Brigades (AABs) and one Advise and Assist Task Force (AATF).

--In the Northern provinces, is USD-North, commanded by the 4ID under MG David Perkins was composed of 2 AABs (4/1CAV and 2/25<sup>th</sup> ID) and 1 AATF (1<sup>st</sup> BDE/1<sup>st</sup> ID).

--USD-Center was headquartered by the 25<sup>th</sup> ID, covered Anbar province and Baghdad provinces, with 2 AABs (4/3ID and 2/1ID). MG Bernard Champeaux was the Commanding General.


--Finally, the 36<sup>th</sup> ID of the Texas Army National Guard, commanded by MG Eddy Spurgin, was in the Southern provinces with 2AABs (3ACR and 3/1CD).

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(U//FOUO) On April 1<sup>st</sup>, 2011 the 310 Expeditionary Support Command (ESC), commanded by Brigadier General Don Cornett, replaced the 103<sup>rd</sup> ESC as the element directing logistical support across Iraq.



(Staff Orientation Training, J3 Directorate 18 June 2011)

(S//REL) The above slide depicts the layout of the various Advise and Assist Brigades as well as show the many different missions these units performed during this quarter.

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## Personnel



### *US Forces – Iraq Personnel Strengths by Month*

		1-Mar	1-Apr	1-May	1-Jun
ARMY	AC	27,756	26,256	26,256	26,256
	RC	3,355	2,972	2,972	2,972
	NG	7,674	9,684	9,829	9,829
AIR FORCE	AC	4,610	4,689	4,675	4,779
	RC	281	281	281	332
	NG	354	413	413	413
NAVY	AC	1,299	1,299	1,299	1,389
	RC	175	191	191	191
MC	AC	68	68	68	68
	RC	9	8	8	8
CG	AC	18	18	18	18
	RC	2	2	2	2
TOTAL		45,601	45,881	46,012	46,257

#### (J1 Quarterly Report 01 April – 30 June 2011)

(U//FOUO) The slide above from the J1 Second Quarter History depicts the USF-I task organization through the reporting period. At the beginning of the reporting period the USF-I troop strength stood at 45,601.

(U//FOUO) By 01 JUL11, the personnel strength is projected to be at 45,509, nearly identical to the beginning of the quarter. In addition to the uniformed strength pictured above, there were a total of 1,159 Federal Civilians working in Iraq as of 30 JUN 11. There were 1,411 working at the beginning of the quarter and the difference reflects an 18% drop in the number of Federal Civilians.

(U//FOUO) During this quarter there were 21 USF-I personnel who were killed in action supporting Operation NEW DAWN. There were 105 wounded in action. Finally, 7 individuals died during the quarter as the result of non-combat injuries.

(U//FOUO) Although, attacks against US forces increased in April, the April trends for the number of security incidents were still down from the 12 month average. This was a good news story for USF-I. However, General Austin warned that we should expect attacks against us to

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
stay elevated for the foreseeable future and he warned that the enemy will take every opportunity to take shots at our forces as they transition and reposture

## Logistics

(U//~~FOUO~~) During the 3<sup>rd</sup> quarter of FY 11 USF-I retrograded 4,906 pieces of rolling stock and 455,618 pieces of non-rolling stock. As the chart below shows, there are roughly 1.11 million pieces of equipment in Iraq. That figure consists of 32,919 pieces of rolling stock and approximately 1.08 million pieces of non-rolling stock. For some categories of equipment, there was a slight increase in numbers within the IJOA. This can be attributed to the recent cycle of RIP/TOAs as well as to the fielding of the XSAPI body armor and MAXXPOR vehicles. No significant change in on-hand balances are expected until the next reporting quarter.

### Equipment Summary (SMD)

LoE 3 / OBJ 12 / EFFs 12.1 / 12.4 / MoEs 12.1.1 / 12.4.2



### (J4 Quarterly Report 01 April – 30 June 2011)

(U//~~FOUO~~) The chart below illustrates a significant decrease in the organizational property in June followed by a quick upturn at the very end of this reporting quarter and the beginning of the next quarter. That trend line directly corresponds with the completion of the various unit RIP/TOAs. The TPE and CMGO (Contractor Managed Government Owned) trend lines show a gradual decrease throughout the quarter as units identified and retrograded non-mission essential

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or excess equipment. The CIF/IPE trend line shows a drastic decrease as CIF closed and finalized their retrograde in June. As a result only 35,000 pieces of IPE remain.

## Equipment Summary (SMD)

LoE 3 / OBJ 12 / EFFs 12.1 / 12.4 / MoEs 12.1.1 / 12.4.2



(J4 Quarterly Report 01 April – 30 June 2011)


## Foreign Excess Personal Property (FEPP)

~~(S//FVEY)~~ During the third quarter of FY 2011, USF-I completed 87 FEPP packets consisting of 58,259 items with a fair market value of over \$15.9 million dollars. From the period of January 2009 through June 30, 2011 USF-I has transferred more than 2.5 million items with a fair market value over \$247.4 million dollars. The chart below shows those figures.

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(J4 Quarterly Report 01 April – 30 June 2011)

## Transportation


(S//~~FVEY~~) USF-I's J4 coordinated the movement of more than 5,500 Theater convoys and 6,000 Iraqi Transportation Network (ITN) truckloads of US Forces' cargo during this quarter. In addition the J4 coordinated with the GoI on the transport of generator turbines to Baghdad International Airport so they could be flown to Canada for repair.

## Base Transfers

(U//~~FOUO~~) USF-I began the quarter with 73 bases and facilitated 13 full and 7 partial base transitions to the GoI. As a result, on 30 June there were 62 bases remaining under USF-I control. The command had anticipated closing 14 bases during this quarter. None of the bases closed this quarter were the large bases. The first of the large bases to close will be FOB Sykes in July.

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(J7 BF & E Quarterly Report 01 April – 30 June 2011)

(S//AGCU) The basing matrix shown below displays the current bases, current transition date, and expected recipient. Bases highlighted in yellow are enduring locations occupied by DoS after 2011. Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force (CJSOTF) bases are not shown on this product.

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## 11-01 USF-I BASE TRANSITIONS

Hub
Spoke
US Base
Partnered Base
DoS, OSC-I or INL Location

USD	Base Name	Est Return Date	Anticipated End State
South	SHOCKER	1-Jul-11	Point of Entry Transition Team
North	SYKES	15-Jul-11	10, 11, 12/3 IA, 6/2 DBE
South	HAMIYAH	15-Jul-11	31 <sup>st</sup> IA, MoD
South	EASTERN BARRACKS	15-Jul-11	39 <sup>th</sup> IA
RAOC	BLACKHAWK ANNEX	1-Aug-11	Gol
RAOC	CAMP TRAVIS	1-Aug-11	Gol
RAOC	EMBASSY ESTATES	1-Aug-11	Gol
RAOC	RIVERSIDE BILLETTS	1-Aug-11	Gol
RAOC	PROSPERITY	1-Aug-11	DoS, Baghdad Ops Cmd
North	K1	1-Aug-11	12 <sup>th</sup> IA HQ, 12 FER, Kirkuk RTC
Center	CROPPER	15-Aug-11	
North	IMN	15-Aug-11	Mol
North	AL KINDI	22-Aug-11	7/2 IA, 2 IA
Center	LOYALTY	1-Sep-11	1 <sup>st</sup> IA
North	AL KISIK	1-Sep-11	3 <sup>rd</sup> IA HQ, 9/3 IA
North	CRUZ MORRIS	15-Sep-11	Diyala Ops Center, CSA Combined Coord Ctr
Center	FALCON	16-Sep-11	2FPTAC
Center	JUSTICE	23-Sep-11	2 <sup>nd</sup> IA
North	COBRA	24-Sep-11	2/1 IA, 4/1 IA, 8/3 DBE
Center	ISS DEASOH	25-Sep-11	17 <sup>th</sup> IA
North	KMTB	27-Sep-11	5 <sup>th</sup> IA
South	ENDEAVOR	30-Sep-11	30 <sup>th</sup> IA BDE
North	HABUR GATE	30-Sep-11	Mol
South	BAOC	30-Sep-11	BaOC Staff

USD	Base Name	Est Return Date	Anticipated End State
South	UMMA QASR	1-Oct-11	OSC-I, Iq Navy
Center	HAMMER	1-Oct-11	OSC-I, 9 <sup>th</sup> IA
Center	TAJI	1-Oct-11	OSC-I, NTM-I, 9 <sup>th</sup> IA
ITAM-P	SHIELD	1-Oct-11	INL, NTM-I, 6 <sup>th</sup> IA
RAOC	UNION III	1-Oct-11	OSC-I, NTM-I, 6 <sup>th</sup> IA
Center	AL MUTHAFIA	3-Oct-11	54/6th IA
Center	AL RASHEED	5-Oct-11	Rusafa Area Cmd and 11 <sup>th</sup> IA
North	WARHORSE	7-Oct-11	5 <sup>th</sup> IA, 18/5 IA, 21/5 IA
North	ERBIL	8-Oct-11	DoS, INL, KRG
North	MAREZ	13-Oct-11	7/2 IA, 26/7 IA, 3 <sup>rd</sup> FP Div
North	BAYJI O.R.	14-Oct-11	Iraqi Oil Protection Police Force, Mol
Center	FALLUJAH	15-Oct-11	1 <sup>st</sup> IA
North	WARRIOR	15-Oct-11	DoS, 10 <sup>th</sup> IA, Kirkuk IP, 5th Iraqi AF
North	SPEICHER	20-Oct-11	IqAF Academy, MoD, OSC-I (T)
North	KAUFMAN	21-Oct-11	Al Askiri FP BDE
South	DELTA	30-Oct-11	8 <sup>th</sup> IA BDE HQ
South	GARRY OWEN	30-Oct-11	TBD
Center	ANBAR PGC	1-Nov-11	Iraqi Police Provincial Headquarters
Center	BLUE DIAMOND	1-Nov-11	Anbar Ops Center
Center	RAMADI	16-Nov-11	DBE, 1/1 <sup>st</sup> IA
North	JBB	30-Nov-11	IqAF, MoD
Center	VBC	1-Dec-11	DoS, NTM-I, ISOF, 6 <sup>th</sup> IA, TIFRC
South	KALSU	16-Dec-11	8 <sup>th</sup> IA
South	ECHO	19-Dec-11	5 <sup>th</sup> DBE
South	ADDER	23-Dec-11	IqAF, MoD
Center	ALASAD	24-Dec-11	7 <sup>th</sup> IA
South	BASRAH	26-Dec-11	DoS, INL, Provincial Gov. IA

As of: 22 June 2011

\*Does not include JFSOCC-I sites (9)  
\*Projected base transition partners

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### (J7 BF & E Quarterly Report 01 April – 30 June 2011)

(S//AGCU) Basing Facilities & Environmental established the Large Base Transition Board (LBTB) and the Embassy Support & Enduring Base Transition Board (ES&EBTB). The LBTB consolidated the Large Base Closure Operational Planning Team, and the Base Management Operational Planning Team into a single forum. The LBTB focuses on non-enduring hub and spoke bases. The LBTB is chaired by the Deputy Commanding General for Sustainment and the J7 Director. The ES&EBTB combined the Embassy Support Working Group and Enduring Base Working Group into one forum chaired by the J7 Director, J4 Director, USEMB-B, and OSC-I.

(S//AGCU) USF-I J7 Environmental Response and Cleanup Teams (ERCT) closed 23 major environmental sites and another 58 were closed by USDs for a total of 81. The ERCT also cleaned up an additional 19 environmental sites in support of the program. The pie chart below shows environmental site closure by type during 3<sup>rd</sup> quarter. During this period, the Environmental Element completed 90 Environmental Site Closure Surveys, USF-I HWTC treated/neutralized 1.76M pounds of environmentally regulated waste, while diverting 431K lbs of material for recycling or reuse. DLA/DRMS supported the mission by recycling 2.89M

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pounds of used oil, coolant, off-spec fuel, crushed filters and batteries through GoI MIM licensed factories.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Conditions were set for the HWTC located at Camp Speicher to allow continued operation into 2012, ensuring the responsible management of regulated waste generated through the EOM. The slide below shows major environmental site closures by month during 3<sup>rd</sup> quarter and projections through EOM.



(J7 BF & E Quarterly Report 01 April – 30 June 2011)


## Construction

(U//~~FOUO~~) The Secretary of Defense decided on May 18<sup>th</sup> that Kirkuk will become an OSC-I site. Kirkuk replaced Umm Qasr as the fourth site selected for use of the \$129.1M Congressional Construction Authority (CCA). The CCA is authority to use FY 11 Army O&M Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funds for construction that otherwise would require separate congressional authorization and appropriation. The slide shown below displays the current construction project data at each of the enduring sites. It also shows the allocation of the \$129.1M CCA.

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### (J7 EST Quarterly Report 01 April – 30 June 2011)

(U//~~FOUO~~) On June 1<sup>st</sup> the congressional notification for the \$129.1M CCA at 4 sites was issued. The authority to obligate these projects arrived on June 16<sup>th</sup>. Based on changes to footprints and cost savings, the USF-I DCG-S submitted a revised congressional notification package to OSD on June 15<sup>th</sup>. OSD then determined the revised notification did not require congressional submission. Lastly on June 16<sup>th</sup> the OBO awarded the Phase III construction contract at Sather Air Base for a cost of \$107 Million.

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
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## Contractor Drawdown



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### Contractors in Support of US Forces – Iraq



Data as of 30 June 11

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(CUB, 30 July 2011)

~~(S//FVEY)~~ The end of June 2011 contractor census showed 61,373 contractors supporting USF-I, a drop of 1,316 (2.1 percent) from the 62,689 contractors in Iraq at the end of May. The numbers this quarter dropped a total of 1,833 from the figure of 63,206 at the end of March.

~~(S//FVEY)~~ The Base Support category remains the largest of the contractor population at 61.9% and is primarily comprised of contractors associated with the LOGCAP contract. The next largest category is Security, which is 16.3% of the population.

~~(S//FVEY)~~ We categorize the Contractor population by nine mission categories. Eight of the categories are mandated by Congress; the ninth category – “Other,” includes contractors not associated with the other categories is the third largest at 10.4%.

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
## Conclusion

(U) This quarter illustrated that the conflict in Iraq is not yet over and that it remains a dangerous place. The quarter ended with the highest number of combat deaths in three years. Through it all, USF-I mourned our losses, celebrated our departing co-workers and continued to move forward. There was progress. Bases were closed, US troops went home as others arrived, and Iraqi troops were trained and equipped. The Iraqi Government continued to function and participate in the daily lives of its citizens.

(U) It was those Iraqi citizens that suffered this quarter too. When a launched rocket did not impact against a US facility, most likely it landed in an Iraqi neighborhood. With their homes and businesses not being reinforced like our structures, they bore the brunt of casualties inflicted by munitions smuggled over the Iranian border into Iraq. They buried their dead killed by weapons fired by AQI and Sectarian Extremist Groups (SEG). Yet with a quiet dignity, they pressed on, moved forward and worked to make Iraq a better place.

(U) The number of Base Closures picked up during the quarter progressed as 11-01 picked up speed and planning initiatives were implemented to ensure personnel, equipment and operations were not adversely affected as a result. Notable among closures was the closure of the Perfume Palace, which had housed the J2 for a number of years.

(U) The quarter set the ground work for the upcoming Phase II of OPOD 11-01. As this quarter drew to an end, the USF-I Headquarters continued efforts that would provide General Austin the operational flexibility to counter any threat presented while continuing to comply with the tenets of the Security Agreement that called for the removal of all US troops by 31 December 2011.



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WILLIAM B. GARRETT III  
Major General, USA  
Chief of Staff

Annexes:

Annex A: USF-I Command and Staff Roster, April through June 2011

Annex B: USF-I Chronology, 01 April through 30 June 2011

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## **Annex A: USF-I Command and Staff Roster, as of 30 June 2011**

### **Headquarters USF-I Command Group**

<b>Commanding General, USF-I</b>	<b>GEN Lloyd Austin III</b>
<b>USF-I Command Sergeant Major</b>	(b)(3), (b)(6)
<b>Deputy Commanding General-Operations (DCG-O)</b>	<b>LTG Frank Helmick</b>
<b>DCG-O Command Sergeant Major</b>	(b)(3), (b)(6)
<b>DCG-Advising &amp; Training (DCG-A&amp;T)</b>	<b>LTG Michael Ferriter</b>
<b>DCG-Support (DCG-S)</b>	<b>MG Edward Cardon</b>
<b>DCG-Detainee Ops (DCG-DO/PMO)</b>	<b>MG Adolph McQueen</b>
<b>CG's POLAD</b>	(b)(6)
<b>CG's Executive Officer</b>	(b)(3), (b)(6)
<b>Commander's Initiatives Group</b>	
<b>Chief of Staff</b>	<b>MG William Garrett III</b>
<b>Deputy Chief of Staff</b>	<b>BG Michael Garrett</b>
<b>Assistant Chief of Staff</b>	(b)(3), (b)(6)
<b>U.S. Embassy – Chief of Mission</b>	<b>Ambassador James F. Jeffrey</b>

### **Primary Staff**

<b>J-1</b>	(b)(3), (b)(6)
<b>J-2</b>	<b>MG Mark Perrin</b>
<b>J-2 JIOC</b>	(b)(3), (b)(6)
<b>J-3</b>	<b>MG Arthur Bartell</b>
<b>J-3 Deputy Director</b>	<b>RDML Kevin Kovacich</b>

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**J-35 FUOPS**

**J-33 CUOPS**

**J-3 Info Ops**

**J-3 CHOPS**

**J-3 Enduring Ops**

**J-3 Air**

**J-3 Force Management**

**J-3 COIC**

**J-3 Training**

**J-4**

**J-4 JLOC**

**J-4 JPIC**

**J-5**

**J-5 Deputy Director**

**J-5 Strategy**

**J-5 Plans**

**J-5 Assessments**

**J-6**

**J-7**

**J-8**

**J-9**

**J-9 Deputy Director**

(b)(3), (b)(6)

**MG Thomas Richardson**

(b)(3), (b)(6)

**BG Jeff Snow**

**Brig Gen Jeffrey Harrigan**

(b)(3), (b)(6)

**RDML(S) Hank Bond**

**BG Scott —“Back” Donahue**

(b)(3), (b)(6)

**MG Jeffrey Buchanan**

(b)(6)

**Special Staff**

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**FSEC**

(b)(6)

**JCC-IA / C3**

**BG Camille Nichols**

**SJA**

**CHAPLAIN**

**IG**

**National Guard Advisor**

**Army Reserve Advisor**

**Knowledge Management**

(b)(3), (b)(6)

**EO/Sexual Harassment**

**Surgeon**

**RED TEAM/Competing Strategies\***

**SJS**

**SAFETY**

(b)(6)

**Command Historian**

(b)(3), (b)(6)

**\*The RED TEAM was disestablished prior to 30 June 2011**

**DCG Advising & Training Staff**

**PSG-I //OSC-I**

(b)(6)

**ITAM MOD**

**ITAM Army**

**ITAM Navy**

**CNATT, Umm Qasr**

**ITAM AF / Air**

**ITAM DIR**

**MOI**

**BG Robin Mealer**

**Brig. (UK) Tim Chicken**

**RDML Kelvin Dixon**

**Brig Gen Anthony Rock**

**BG Bradley May**

(b)(6)

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**Police**

**BG Michael Smith**

**Intel**



**ISF LOG**

**ISAM**

**Brig Gen Scott Jansson**

**USF-I Major Subordinate Commands**

**USD-N**

**MG David Perkins**

**USD-C**

**MG Bernard Champoux**

**USD-S**

**MG Eddy Spurgin**

**Expeditionary Support Command**

**BG Mark Corson**

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## **Annex B: USF-I Chronology 01 April – 30 June 2011**

**01 April**— The Ministry of Agriculture announces that palm date production last season exceeded 420,000 tons. The MoA has been working with the private sector on a massive rehabilitation program to increase palm date production.

Iraq's first US school trained instructor pilot flies a training flight with a student pilot in a T-6 trainer aircraft.

**02 April**— A British court ruling allows Kuwait Airways to pursue litigation against the Iraqi government to obtain restitution for assets stolen by Iraq during its 1990 invasion of Kuwait. Losses are estimated at \$1.3 billion dollars.

Two US soldiers are killed by indirect fire after their position was attacked in Babil Province.

**03 April**—The European Union announces they are expanding their efforts in Iraq to include missions into Erbil. The commission specializes in developing capacity in the areas of justice, reforms, and security.

A US soldier dies as the result of a non-combat related injury in Mosul.

**04 April**— A US soldier dies as the result of a non-combat related injury in Baghdad.

**05 April**—A US soldier dies as the result of a non-combat related injury in Mosul.

**06 April**—SECDEF Robert Gates arrives in Baghdad for two days of talks with the GoI.

**07 April**— Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki stated that the Iraqi Security Forces, both the IA and the IP, have the capability now to repel any aggression and that the capabilities are improving constantly.

**10 April**—A US soldier dies as the result of a non-combat related injury sustained the previous day in Kirkuk.

**19 April**—A US sailor supporting Operation new Dawn dies as the result of a non-combat related injury on board the USS Enterprise.

**20 April**—Austrian Air announced they would begin operations into Baghdad.

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**21 April**—The Department of Defense announces the deployment of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Advise and Assist Brigade, 82<sup>nd</sup> Airborne Division out of Fort Bragg as part of an upcoming rotation of forces supporting Operation New Dawn.

The new Iraqi Air Operations Center (IAOC), located at Hawk Base, Victory Base Complex, opens.

**22 April**—Two US soldiers are killed in Numaniyah during an IED attack.

**25 April**—The Ministry of Energy (MoE) requests immediate Iraqi airport upload support through the US Iraqi Strategic Partnership Office (ISPO) for two 17 ton and one 13 ton jet powered turbine engines at Baghdad International Airport. The MoE doesn't have the proper lift equipment to load the engines onto the cargo plane bound for Canada where the turbine engine refurbishments would be made

**27 April**—A US soldier dies as a result of a non-combat related injury in Babil Province.

**29 April**—A US soldier dies as the result of a RPG attack by insurgents in the Qadisiyah province.

**30 April**—The USF-I J2 Strategic Vetting Team is stood down

**01 May**— USF-I J9 LNO operations cease at the US Embassy Treasury section.

The US Embassy Pol-Mil Section assumes the role as the US lead agent for the SoI program.

**04 May**—The Iraqi people publish a new revised version of the June 2007 draft hydrocarbon legislation.

**05 May**—A car bomb explodes outside a police station in Hilla, killing 24 and injuring 72.

**07 May**— Six policemen, including three high ranking officers, along with eleven prisoners are killed during a 6 hour gun battle inside the Ministry of Interior in Baghdad during an attempted prisoner escape.

**10 May**— Kuwait begins construction of the Mubarak port just across the border from the construction site of Iraq's new \$6 billion port near Umm Qasr. Economists estimate the Mubarak port could reduce Iraq's main port traffic by up to 60%.

**12 May**—The British contingent in ITAM-Navy conduct a hand-over ceremony at Umm Qasr. This ends their 7 year mission in Iraq.

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**15 May**—USF-I J9 turns lead of the Executive Services Division (ESD) over to the US Embassy.

**18 May**—Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki orders the Iraqi Army to replace the Iraqi Oil Police in protecting the Beiji Oil Refinery. This move is in response to the January attack that destroyed key units and crippled the refinery.

The Ministry of Electricity announces they have contracted for 25 power stations with the Korean STX. The stations, which will run from Basrah to the south of Baghdad, will each generate 100 megawatts.

Secretary of Defense Gates decides that Kirkuk will become an OSC-I site.

**19 May** –A bombing outside a police station in Kirkuk kills 27 and wounds scores more.

The Iraqi Planning and Development Ministry announces that Iraq's core interest rate was up in April to 5.8% from January's 5.3% rate.

President Jalal Talibani issues a mandate naming Vice President Abel Abd-al-Mahdi as his first deputy.

**21 May**—Change 1 to OPORD 11-01 is published as FRAGO 487.

**22 May**—A series of explosions in and around the Baghdad area kills 16 people, most of them Iraq Security Forces personnel.

British military forces end their last hands-on mission in Iraq after more than 8 years of service. Eighty-one Royal Navy sailors turned over the task of patrolling the waters off Umm Qasr to the Iraqi Navy.

Two US soldiers are killed during an IED attack in Baghdad.

**23 May** –After MoO, MoI, and USD-N completed requisite security requirements to open the HAA pipeline, Minister Luaibi announces that first priority would be opening the Mushada pipeline to supply Baghdad with fuel because there is insufficient benzene to prime both lines simultaneously.

**24 May**—The DoD announces the deployment of HQ, 3<sup>rd</sup> ID along with the 1<sup>st</sup> BCT of 1CD and 4<sup>th</sup> BCT of 1AD to Iraq in support of Operation NEW DAWN.

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**30 May**—USF-I J9 LNO operations end at the US Embassy POLMIL section and at USAID.

The MoE announces that electrical transmission tower # 61 has been felled by sabotage. It is the third tower attack this month.

**31 May**—The USF-I J2 Directorate of Strategic Intelligence Engagement is stood down.

**01 June**—Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq (OSC-I) achieves Initial Operational Capacity (IOC)

**02 June**—Iraqi Security Forces raid Trade Bank of Iraq (TBI), Iraq's premier bank, in a move that the GoI states is a move against corruption. TBI's director, (b)(6) flees to Lebanon. (b)(6)

**05 June**—The GoI signs the final contracts for the development of two natural gas fields—the Siba gas field in southern Iraq with an expected capacity of 100 million cubic feet per day (mcf/d), and the Mansuriya gas field in eastern Iraq, which has an estimated capacity of 320 mcf/d.

**06 June**—Five US Soldiers are killed during an indirect fire attack in Baghdad.

**07 June**—The 100 day period set by Prime Minister al-Maliki on February 27<sup>th</sup> expires.

**08 June**—Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki issues an order removing Ahmad Chalabi as head of the de-Ba'athification commission.

Austrian Air began operations into Baghdad as first western European Carrier.

A US Soldier is killed during an IED attack in An Najaf Province.

**09 June**—Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki announces he is setting a second 200 day ultimatum for performance improvement among the GOI ministries.

**11 June**—SECDEF Leon Panetta says the US will take unilateral action when needed to deal with the threat posed to US troops by Shi'ite militias.

**13 June**—Two US Soldiers are killed in Wasit Province during an IED attack.

The USF-I J9 Plans Division ceases operations.

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**14 June**— Stuart Bowen, head of SIGIR, tells the *LA Times* that approximately \$6.6 billion flown to Iraq 8 years ago may have been stolen. SIGIR is currently conducting a third audit to find the money which was shipped to Iraq in 2003-2004. The money was intended to pay for reconstruction and Iraqi officials are threatening to go to court to reclaim the money.

**16 June**—A US Soldier dies of wounds received during an indirect fire attack on June 6, 2011 in Baghdad.

**19 June**— Iraqi Parliament Speaker Osam al-Najai tells al-Jazeera that the missing money that SIGIR is currently auditing is \$18.7 billion based on reports he's seen, rather than \$6.6 billion.

**22 June**—Iraq and Iran sign a deal to import 1.5 million leters of oil from Iraq fo a one-year period. Negotiations are ongoing to increase the level to 3 million liters.

**23 June**—A senior Iraq Central Bank advisor, Mudhhir Muhammad Salih, says the Government has adopted a two-pronged plan to restructure the national currency in order to facilitate large transactions and make government accounts more efficient.

**25 June**—The Algerian Government announces they have written off all of Iraq's debt to Algeria in a move designed to enhance Iraq's economy.

**26 June**—State of Law Coalition Member of Parliament Adnan Al Assadi announces he has officially resigned from the Parliament.

Two US Soldiers are killed In Diyala Province as the result of an IED attack. A US soldier dies as the result of a non-combat related injury in Wasit Province.

**29 June**—Main body of 20<sup>th</sup> Engineer Brigade moves to COB Adder to conduct RIP/TOA with the Directorate of Security for COB Adder.

Three US Soldiers are killed in Badrah when indirect fire hits their base camp at COS Shocker..

**30 June**—The Department of Defense announces that the 25<sup>th</sup> ID Headquarters unit is being extended 30 days past their original 2 December redeployment date.

Advise, Train, Assist and Equip (ATA-E) missions end in USD-N.

The Department of Defense announces that additional campaign stars are authorized for wear on the Iraq Campaign Medal. The additional campaign is Operation New Dawn.

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As mandated by United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1956, Iraq takes greater control over its oil wealth by opening a new account at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to replace the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) account.

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